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THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF
CONSUMER DEBT COLLECTION AND ITS
REGULATION
Todd J. Zywicki
I. INTRODUCTION

he ability to effectively and efficiently collect consumer debts is a crucial underpinning of the American economy. Without the ability to enforce contracts, consumer lending would be scarce and expensive.
Everyone would be worse off.
Yet collecting debt from insolvent or reluctant
consumers is a complicated enterprise, inherently
fraught with a conflict of interest between creditors and
debtors. Consumers may dodge or mislead creditors, and
creditors will try to track down delinquent consumers to
get them to pay. If consumers are routinely subject to
collection methods that they perceive as unfair, they will
be reluctant to borrow.
The regulation of debt collection activities presents a challenge from an economic perspective. In theory, well-designed debt collection rules can aid both borrowers and lenders by increasing access to and reducing
prices for consumer credit. But poorly designed rules can
reduce the effectiveness of debt collection, which will in-
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crease losses and lead to higher prices and less access to
credit for consumers, especially low-income and highrisk consumers. Rules intended to protect consumers
from some credit collection practices could lead creditors to use alternatives that consumers prefer even less.
The economics and regulation of debt collection
took on heightened scrutiny after the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) announced a rulemaking
procedure (Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, or
ANPR) to consider amendments to the federal regime
governing debt collection practices.1 This article provides
an economic framework to guide the CFPB in its efforts
to issue new regulation of the debt collection industry
based on sound economic and empirical analysis.
Effective regulation of creditor remedies requires
1) an understanding of the role that effective debt collection plays in the consumer credit system, 2) proper identification of the purported market failure to be corrected,
and 3) a determination of whether proposed regulations
will, in fact, ameliorate those market failures such that
the benefits of the regulations to consumers will exceed
the costs. Moreover, as the CFPB considers new regulations, it is not writing on a clean slate. Before imposing
new regulations, the CFPB should first examine the effectiveness of old regulations and the marginal effect of
adding new rules to old.
Although controversial at the time of adoption,
earlier generations of legislation and regulation of debt
collection practices have generally been accepted as beneficial to consumers and the economy because they eliminated archaic and oppressive practices. In a sense, the
low-hanging fruit of regulation has been picked - those
practices that continue in use are much more likely to
have overall economic benefits that exceed their costs, at
least in many contexts. As a result, further regulation requires nuance to preserve the efficacy of collections.

1 Debt Collection (Regulation F), 78 Fed. Reg. 67848 (proposed Nov.

12, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1006).
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Moreover, most major debt collection legislation and
regulations were issued in the 1970s and 1980s, before
electronic communications and cell phones fundamentally transformed consumers' communication habits. In
light of this history and recent developments, the CFPB
must consider all the marginal benefits and costs of any
new regulation of debt collection practices as well as alternatives to regulation, such as industry self-regulation,
that can provide flexibility to the regulatory system.
This paper examines the law and economics of
debt collection and its regulation. After providing a
background on the industry and the historical evolution
of its regulatory structure, the paper focuses on the basic
economics of debt collection and the regulatory regime
that governs it. The last section of the paper applies the
discussion developed herein to consider some of the major elements of the CFPB's proposal to regulate debt collection.
II. BACKGROUND: THE DEBT COLLECTION INDUSTRY
Most consumer debts, whether credit card debt,
student loans, medical debt, auto loans, or mortgages,
are paid in their ordinary course. According to one estimate, approximately 95% of all consumer debt is paid on
time, and less than half of consumers have been reported as thirty or more days late on a payment.2 Even this
high level of voluntary payment depends in part on the
perceived effectiveness of the debt collection system in
the event of nonpayment.
Yet many consumers do not pay their debts in a
timely and voluntary manner. The CFPB estimates that
some thirty million American adults had debts in the collection process in 2013.1 Approximately two in ten con2

See DBA INT'L, THE DEBT BUYING INDUSTRY: A WHITE PAPER 4 (Jan. 8,

2015),
http ://www.dbainternational.org/members-only/DBA-WhitePaper.p
df [hereinafter DBA INT'L, DEBT BUYING] (citing Fair Isaac Corp.).
I See 2014 CFPB FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT: CFPB ANN. REP.,
at
7
(Mar.
20,
2014),
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201403-cfpb-fair-debt-
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sumers have been more than ninety days overdue on an
account at some time.4 Although many delinquent debts
are collected by the creditors that issued the credit,
many debts are transferred to debt collectors, who try to
collect the debt on a contingency basis, or are sold outright to debt buyers, who collect in their own name. In
addition, many debts are collected through legal proceedings in court; legal practices involved in collection
have grown steadily over time.'
The industry is subdivided still further because
some collection firms and debt buyers specialize in the
types of debt that they collect. For example, firms may
specialize in the collection of credit card, student loan,
medical, or other debt.' In some instances, specialization
occurs because certain types of debt are subject to certain regulatory limits that tend to promote specialization. Examples include medical debts, which are subject
to particular privacy requirements, as well as student
loan debts, for which collectors have broader collection
powers under the law.7 Specialization may also result
from variance in the size of outstanding debts among
different types of debt. For example, the average face
value of outstanding balances on mortgages and auto
loans purchased by debt buyers tends to be substantial
($48,669 for mortgages and $6,489 for auto loans),
whereas the average size of the outstanding balance on
utilities, telecommunications, and bad checks is relatively small (under $500).8 The methods used to collect debts
with an average size of a few hundred dollars will differ
from those used to collect debts with an average size of
several thousand dollars.
In addition, within each subsector of the industry
there is substantial competition. For example, third-party

collection-practices-act.pdf [hereinafter CFPB, FDCPA ANN. REP.].
4 DBA INT'L, DEBT BUYING, supra note 2, at 4.
See Debt Collection (Regulation F), supra note 1, at 67850.
6 See id.
7 See id.
8 U.S. FED. TRADE COMM'N, THE STRUCTURE AND PRACTICES OF THE DEBT
BUYING
INDUSTRY
T-4,
table
4
(Jan.
2013),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2013/01/debtbuyingreport.pdf
[hereinafter
FTC, STRUCTURE AND PRACTICES].
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collection agencies have been getting larger, and the industry is becoming more consolidated, but the thirdparty debt collection industry still has many small participants. With respect to the debt-buying industry, for example, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) reports that
in 2008 the nine largest debt-buying firms purchased
76.1% of all debt sold in the United States that year.9
However, the respective market shares of industry leaders vary greatly over time, suggesting that competition
within these industries is robust.10 The FTC reports that
debt buyers purchased an estimated $72.3 billion in consumer debt in 2008.11 About 75% of all debt sold each
year to debt buyers is credit card debt. 12 According to the
FTC, on average, debt buyers paid four cents for each
dollar of debt purchased; however, the figure varies according to the age of debt (debt buyers pay more for
newer debt) and type of debt (for example, paying more
for mortgage and credit card debt than for utility and
telecommunications debt). 3 With respect to debt collectors, according to one estimate, more than 4,000 thirdparty debt collection firms employed more than 140,000
people and reported revenue of $11.7 billion in 2010.14

According to a study that Ernst & Young conducted for
ACA International, a national trade association representing third-party contingency collection agencies, the
collection industry returned $44.6 billion to creditors in
20101 and $44.9 billion in 2013.16
9 FTC, STRUCTURE AND PRACTICES,
10Id. at

supra note 8, at 14.

14-15.

1 Id. at 7 (citing Credit Card Debt Sales in 2008, 921 NILSON REP. 10
(Mar. 2009).
12FTC, STRUCTURE AND PRACTICES, supra note 8, at 13.
13 Id. at 23-24, Table 7 at T-8.
14

ROBERT M. HUNT, UNDERSTANDING THE MODEL: THE LIFE CYCLE OF A DEBT

10
(June
6,
2013),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/publicevents/li
fe-debt-data-integrity-debt-collection/understandingthemodel.pdf
(presentation at the FTC-CFPB Roundtable).
15ERNST & YOUNG, THE IMPACT OF THIRD-PARTY DEBT COLLECTION ON THE
NATIONAL AND STATE ECONOMIES 6 (Feb. 2012).
16 ERNST & YOUNG, THE IMPACT OF THiRD-PARTY DEBT COLLECTION ON THE

NATIONAL AND STATE ECONOMIES IN

for ACA International).

2013 (July 2014) (report prepared
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Barriers to entry in the debt collection industry
have historically been very low and competition has been
robust. Third-party debt collectors and buyers have
tended to operate on a local basis. 17 The industry appears
to concentrate over time as a result of government regulation, especially regulatory guidance issued by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and DoddFrank financial reforms.18 The elimination of smaller debt
collecting and debt buying businesses, however, has adverse consequences for consumers. Smaller businesses,
for example, may have a better understanding of local
economic conditions in terms of developing workable
repayment plans for consumers. 9 Smaller businesses
may also be able to exert supervisory authority by management over the activities of those in contact with consumers, thereby providing greater safeguards against
overreaching behavior.
Costly regulations that eliminate small collections
firms may also harm consumers by dampening competition. Often times, consumers have multiple accounts in
collections with different collection agencies. Consumers,
with their limited resources, may benefit from competition among debt collectors by playing them against each
other by choosing which debts to pay. Thus, competition
can empower them with leverage when negotiating a settlement or payment plan and by rewarding the debt collector that is the most professional in terms of respecting a consumer's rights and dignity.

III. REGULATORY BACKGROUND
Debt collection practices are subject to extensive

17

See U.S. FED. TRADE COMM'N, COLLECTING CONSUMER DEBTS: THE

OF CHANGE-A WORKSHOP REPORT
15
(Feb. 2009),
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/debtcollection/dcwr.pdf
[hereinafter FTC, COLLECTING CONSUMER DEBTS].
18 See Tanya D. Marsh, The Unknown Costs of Dodd-Frank, DBA:
MAGAZINE, Fall 2014, at 16.
19 See Brian Fair, Keep Small Business in the Credit Cycle, HILL (May
20,
2016,
6:00
PM),
http://thehill.com/blogs/congressblog/economy-budget/242594-keep-small-business-in-the-creditcycle.
CHALLENGES
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regulation at both the state and federal levels. Determining whether new regulations will benefit consumers requires an assessment of their marginal costs and benefits. In turn, this determination requires
an
understanding of the existing regulatory framework and
the way new regulations fit within that framework. In
particular, as will be seen, many of the most questionable debt collection practices have already been prohibited or heavily regulated. Further regulation presents
much closer judgments as to whether the marginal benefits of additional regulation will exceed the marginal
costs for consumers.
Collection activities fall into two basic categories:
legal and extralegal. 0 Legal actions refer to bringing a
lawsuit to collect a debt or, where applicable, bringing a
legal action to seize a debtor's property, such as foreclosing on a home. Extralegal actions refer to the variety
of informal actions that a creditor can initiate to persuade a debtor to pay some or all of a debt without recourse to legal process. Examples of such actions include
sending letters, making phone calls, or taking other similar actions that fall short of initiating a lawsuit. In general, extralegal processes tend to be less expensive for
creditors, debtors, and society at large.
Regulation of debt collection also can take two
forms. In some instances, regulation is prescriptive, such
as an outright prohibition on the enforceability of certain
contract terms or on the use of certain remedies. For example, the remedy of imprisonment for debt was prohibited throughout the United States in the 19th century.2'
Other less extreme practices, such as contacting a debtor's employer about a delinquent debt, were outlawed
more recently, especially during a wave of regulatory activity beginning in the 1970s. Other regulations are not
prescriptive but seek to distinguish between legitimate
contacts with a debtor and harassing or intimidating be20

Extralegal collection practices, such as phone calls and letters,

should be distinguished from illegal methods, such as loan sharking,
which rely on the threat and use of physical harm.
21
Debtors'
Prison,
WUPEDLA,
http s://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Debtors%2 7-prison#United-States-ofAmerica.
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havior, such as rules governing the times at which a
debtor may be contacted by phone or the permissible
content of communications.
Creditors' remedies historically were governed by
state law, consistent with the reality that most consumer
credit transactions were between consumers and in-state
lenders, such as local banks, personal finance companies,
and local retailers such as department stores or appliance stores. 22 Several states placed new limits on credi-

tors' remedies when they adopted the Uniform Consumer Credit Code or similar consumer credit protection
laws beginning in the late 1960s.11 Today, even though
the federal government has increased its role, creditors'
remedies and collection practices remain heavily regulated at the state level as well.
From the beginning, the federal government also
has exercised some role in the regulation of creditors'
remedies. Indeed, a major purpose of the U.S. Constitution was to restrain debtor-friendly state legislatures
from enacting laws that frustrated creditor collection efforts, especially by out-of-state creditors. The Full Faith
and Credit Clause, diversity jurisdiction for federal
courts, Bankruptcy Clause, and the Contracts Clause
were all in large part designed to tie the hands of debtorfriendly
state legislatures and to aid in the collection of
24
debt.

One of the first significant federal interventions into the debt collection sphere came in 1968 "when the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) published guidelines
describing explicit collection practices it deemed to be
unfair or deceptive trade practices and therefore subject

12

See THOMAS A. DURKIN, GREGORY ELLIEHAUSEN, MICHAEL E. STATEN &

TODD ZYWICKI, CONSUMER CREDIT AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY

520 (2014).

11See Peter V. Letsou, The PoliticalEconomy of Consumer Credit Regulation, 44 EMORY L.J. 587, 590 (1995).
24 See, e.g., Todd J. Zywicki, Bankruptcy Clause, HERITAGE GUIDE
CONST.,

http://www.heritage.org/constitution#!/articles/1/essays/41/bankr
uptcy-clause (noting that the original purpose of the Bankruptcy
Clause was to strengthen interstate collection of debts, not to protect debtors).
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to prosecution. '' 2 According to economist Robert Hunt,

"[iln the 20 years ending in 1977, the FTC filed cases
26
against approximately 10 collection agencies a year.

The first federal statutory regulation of ordinary
creditors' remedies came in 1970 with the Consumer
Credit Protection Act, which restricted the use of wage
garnishment to a maximum of 25% of wages, with certain
exceptions, such as for the Internal Revenue Service.
Today, some states augment the federal limits by restricting wage garnishment further or prohibiting it altogether. 2 Also in 1970, Congress enacted the Fair Credit

Reporting Act.
In 1977, Congress passed the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act (FDCPA). The Act was motivated by several
concerns. First, Congress considered regulation to be insufficient in some states. According to a U.S. Senate report at the time, thirteen states had no debt collection
laws at all, and Congress considered the laws in sixteen
more states to be inadequate.29
Second, even where state regulation was thought in
principle to be adequate, Congress believed that several
factors had evolved to make state regulation less effective than in the past. In large part, the increased federal
role reflected the growing interstate nature of consumer
credit markets, especially the development of credit card
lending, and the perceived difficulty of state-based regulation of out-of-state creditors and debt collectors. Less
obvious but no less important, the dramatic advancements in telecommunications technology-particularly
the rapid drop in the cost of long-distance phone callsM. Hunt, Collecting Consumer Debt in America, PHILA. FED.
Bus. REv. Q2, at 17 (2007).
22 Robert
26 Id.

See Richard M. Hynes & Eric A. Posner, The Law and Economics of
Consumer Finance,4 AM. L. &EcON. REv. 168, 178-79 (2002).
28 See Chuck
Rice, A Guide Through the Garnishment Jungle,
27

KIIPATRICKTOWNSEND.COM,

available

at

http ://www.kilpatricktownsend.com/en/Knowledge-Center/Publicat
ions/Articles/2000/04/AGuideThroughtheGarnishmentJungle.aspx
(last visited May 6, 2016).
2" See Hunt, supra note 25, at 20; see also S. REP. No. 95-382, at 1697
(1977).
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increasingly made interstate efforts to collect debts less
expensive. Not only did those developments increase the
likelihood that a debtor might borrow from an out-ofstate creditor, but also if the debtor borrowed from an
in-state lender, the debt still might at some point be assigned or sold to an out-of-state third-party debt collector.3 0 Moreover, growing interstate labor mobility could
have the opposite consequence if the debtor changed his
or her place of residence and turned a former in-state
debtor-creditor relationship into an interstate one.
The FDCPA was designed to prohibit collection
practices deemed to be unfair or harassing to consumers-such as contacting third parties-and to regulate
the type of information that can be disclosed to third
parties. The Act also limited the times and places that a
debtor could be contacted, and it prohibited communications that are obscene or threatening, that are false or
deceptive in content, or that harass the consumer, such
as repeated telephone calls. The FDCPA further required
the collector to provide certain information to the debtor
and established protections and procedures for consumers to dispute a debt. The Act permitted injured consumers to collect damages for violations of the law, and
it authorized class action suits against debt collectors.
Moreover, although the federal protections are extensive,
they are not preemptive: states are permitted to enact
stronger consumer protections that go beyond those in
the FDCPA. Many do so. Writing almost a decade ago,
Robert Hunt noted that at the time more than forty
states had their own laws that applied to third-party debt
collectors and that more than thirty states had laws that
applied to creditors collecting their own debts. 1
One of the most notable elements of the FDCPA is
its limited coverage. By its terms, it applies only to thirdparty debt collectors and not to originating creditors.
Hunt characterizes the rationales for heightening regulation of third-party debt collectors but not the originating
creditors as "somewhat convoluted," but he identifies

30 See
31 See

Hunt, supra note 25, at 20.
id.
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several possible reasons for the distinction.12 First, many
lenders, especially financial institutions, were subject to
ongoing supervision by banking regulators; thus, their
improper practices were thought to be easier to detect
and punish than were those of debt collectors. Second,
barriers to entry in the industry were low, so it was
feared that if a firm was disciplined, its employees could'
easily form again under a different name or in a different
state with minimal effort. Thus, deterrence was thought
to be weaker for third-party collectors than for originating creditors."
Third, and most relevant for contemporary debates, it was argued that debt collectors would be less
constrained by concern about goodwill and other reputational issues than would be creditors collecting their own
debts because creditors would be collecting from their
own customers and thus be unwilling to damage those
relationships. 4 Consistent with the hypothesis that thirdparty debt collectors would be willing to use more intensive debt collection techniques than originating creditors
would, it was also reported at the time that consumers
complained more frequently against third-party debt collectors than against creditors.
In addition, there was the simple matter of practical politics. Given the controversial nature of the legislation at the time, Hunt claims that the law would not have
passed had original creditors been included. He characterizes the legislation as having been "highly controver32 Id.

Hunt notes that at the time of the FDCPA, although debt collec-

tors increasingly crossed state lines, most debtors still borrowed
from banks and retailers within their state. Thus, it was argued that
state regulation would be adequate to regulate original creditors and
that federal regulation was unnecessary. In light of the growth of interstate consumer credit markets since that time, that distinction no
longer applies. Thus, the text focuses on the arguments that are still
possibly relevant.
31Id. The industry remains highly fragmented and competitive today.
See FTC, STRUCTURE AND PRACTICES, supra note 8, at 15-16.
"' See Hunt, supra note 2 5, at 20; see also Debt Collection (Regulation
F), supra note 1, at 67853 ("Congress excluded such creditors in
1977 because it concluded that the risk of reputational harm would
be sufficient to deter creditors from engaging in harmful debt collection practices.").
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sial," noting that it was criticized as infringing on traditional state power, as being overly restrictive, and as being "an attempt to protect deadbeats that would reduce
the efficiency of the credit market. ' 35 In fact, the FDCPA

passed the House of Representatives by only one vote in
1977.36

Since that time, the federal government has remained active in the regulation of debt collection. In
1985, the FTC issued its credit practices rule, which,
among other provisions, made unenforceable several
remedies that had previously been permitted under law.37
Prohibited remedies included confessions of judgment,
wage assignment, waivers of statutory property exemptions, and nonpurchase money security interests in
household goods. Although these remedies were technically legal in some states, they were rarely preserved in
consumer credit contracts and, even if preserved in the
contract, were even less frequently invoked in practice.38
The Federal Reserve Board,39 the Federal Home Loan Bank41
Board, 40 and the National Credit Union Administration

adopted similar rules as well. Until the enactment of the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act, which created the CFPB, the FTC was the primary
federal enforcer of federal debt collection regulations.
Dodd-Frank established the CFPB and in 2010
transferred primary responsibility for enforcing federal
laws governing debt collection from the FTC to the CFPB.
In addition, Dodd-Frank provided general authority to
the CFPB to engage in supervision, enforcement, and
11Hunt, supra note

25, at 20.

36 Id.

31 Trade Regulation Rule: Credit Practices, 49 Fed. Reg. 7740 (Mar. 1,
1984).
38See DURKIN ET AL.,

supra note 22, at 525-29 (describing empirical ev-

idence on contracting and use of various remedies prior to federal
regulation).
19 Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices: Credit Practices, 50 Fed. Reg.
16695 (Apr. 29, 1985).
40 Consumer Protections: Unfair or Deceptive Credit Practices, 50
Fed. Reg. 19325 (May 8, 1985).
41 Federal Credit Union; Prohibited Lending Practices, 52 Fed. Reg.
35060 (Sept. 17, 1987).
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rulemaking and to issue guidance to prevent "unfair, deceptive, and abusive acts or practices" by covered parties, including debt collectors. Pursuant to this authority,
the CFPB brought its first enforcement action in October
2012.42 That same month, the CFPB issued its larger participant rule providing for supervision of large debt collection agencies, which it estimated would cover approximately 175 debt collectors that account for over 60% of
the industry's annual receipts." In July 2013, the CFPB
issued two supervisory bulletins intended to offer guidance to the industry. One provided guidance on the
CFPB's understanding of unfair, deceptive, and abusive
acts and practices when collecting debts," and the other
pertained to representations about credit reports and
credit scores made during debt collection efforts. 4 At the
same time, the CFPB also began accepting consumer
complaints regarding debt collectors.46
Under the watch of both the FTC and the CFPB,
debt collection has regularly been the subject of the largest number of consumer complaints, with complaints
against third-party debt collectors constituting a majority of those grievances. For example,- the CFPB reports
that from July 2013 until the end of that year, it received
approximately 30,300 complaints from consumers about
debt collection efforts-most commonly about debts that
the consumer claimed were not owed or about what the
debtor claimed were improper "communication tactics,"
See Debt Collection (Regulation F), supra note 1, at 678 51.
Defining Larger Participants of the Consumer Debt Collection Market, 77 Fed. Reg. 65775 (Oct. 31, 2012) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt.
1090).
44 CFPB, CFPB BuLL. 2013-07, PROHIBITION OF UNFAIR, DECEPTIVE, OR
42

41

ABuSIvE ACTS OR PRACTICES IN THE COLLECTION OF CONSUMER DEBTS (July

10, 2013),
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/2 0130 7cfpb-bulletin-unfairdeceptive-abusive-practices.pdf.
41 CFPB , CFPB BuLL. 2013-08, REPRESENTATIONS REGARDING EFFECT OF
DEBT PAYMENTS ON CREDIT REPORTS AND SCORES (July 10, 2013),
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/2 0130 7cfpb-bu~letin-collection
s-consumer-credit.pdf.
46

See

Submit

a

Complaint,

http://www.consumerfinance.gov/complaint/#debt-collection
visited Mar. 21, 2016).

CFPB,
(last
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such as repeated telephone calls. 7 Yet given that some
thirty million debts are in the collection process in any
given year, a relatively small number of consumers register formal complaints.48
With respect to the accuracy of debts, the FTC estimates that 3.2% of the debts that debt buyers attempt
to collect are disputed. 9 According to a regulatory comment filed by the Debt Buyers Association International
(DBA International), the experience of DBA International's members suggests that 85% of debt buyers claim that
less than 5% of their accounts are disputed. 0 In addition,
the FTC finds that over half of debts disputed by consumers are subsequently verified; thus, on average,
about 1-2% of consumer debt that debt buyers seek to
collect are actually disputed and found to be invalid for
some reason. 1 Moreover, the verification rate varies by
age and type of debt. For example, newer debt is verified
more frequently than older debt, and credit card debt is
verified more frequently than medical, telecommunications, or utility debt. 2 According to the DBA International survey, 82% of debt buyers report that they find an error less than 5% of the time that a debt is disputed, and
only 1.2% state that they find an error more than half the

47

CFPB, FDCPA ANN. REP., supra note 3. For 2013, the FTC received

73,211 complaints from consumers about debt collectors, mostly
about third-party debt collectors. Id. at 17. According to a review by
the Government Accountability Office of collections on credit card
debt, first-party collection efforts generate fewer consumer complaints than do third-party collectors, and complaints against originating creditors are disproportionately against subprime credit card
issuers. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO 09-748, CREDIT
CARDS: FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT COULD BETTER REFLECT THE
EVOLVING DEBT COLLECTION MARKETPLACE AND USE OF TECHNOLOGY 30-34

(Sept. 2009).
DBA INT'L, DEBT BUYING supra note 2, at 4. Of course, surely some
dissatisfied consumers do not register a formal complaint; thus, this
figure is not exhaustive.
49 FTC, STRUCTURE AND PRACTICES, supra note 8, at 38.
50 DBA INT'L, INTRODUCTION TO DBA's ANPR RESPONSE 30 (Feb. 28, 2014)
[hereinafter DBA INT'L, INTRODUCTION.
11 FTC, STRucTuRE AND PRACTICES, supra note 8, at 40-41.
52 Id.
48
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time."
At the same time that the CFPB was assuming responsibility for administering federal laws regarding
debt collection, the OCC was considering new risk management guidance to establish best practices regarding
the use of debt collectors by nationally chartered banks.54
On August 4, 2014, the OCC issued its guidance with respect to the use of debt buyers, cautioning banks about
potential risks associated with using third-party debt collectors.5
In November 2013, the CFPB issued an Advance
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR) seeking information and stating the possible need for further regulation of the debt collection system. 6 In its ANPR, the CFPB
proposes several dramatic changes to the debt collection
system. First, it proposes extending the provisions of the
FDCPA, which currently apply only to third-party debt
collectors, to creditors collecting their own debts." The
rationale for this proposal is that "experience since passage of the FDCPA suggests that first-party collections
are in fact a significant concern in their own right." 8 Second, the CFPB proposes new requirements for the type
of information that must be transferred from creditors
to third-party collectors to improve the accuracy and efficiency of the debt collection system and to facilitate the
DBA INT'L, INTRODUCTION, supra note 50, at 30.
" See Shining a Light on the Consumer Debt Industry Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on FinancialInstitutions and Consumer Protection of
the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 113th Cong.
(July 17, 2013).
" OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC BULL. 2014-37,
CONSUMER DEBT SALES: DESCRIPTION: RISK MANAGEMENT GUIDANCE (Aug. 4,
2014), http ://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/bulletins/2014/bulletin2014-37.html [hereinafter OCC BULL]
56 Debt Collection (Regulation F), supra note
1.
17 Id. at 67853.
13

Id. The CFPB argues that this concern about originating creditors is
longstanding, noting the FTC's assertion made two years after the
FDCPA that "there is little difference between the practices employed by certain creditors and those employed by debt collection
firms. Indeed, there is evidence that the collection practices of creditors may be more egregious than those practices engaged in by debt
collection firms." Id. (quoting 1979 FTC, FDCPA ANN. REP. 7).
58
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provision of information to consumers. 9 Third, the proposed rulemaking would impose new requirements regarding the notice to be provided to consumers when a
debt is placed with a third-party collection agency and
amendments to the processes by which consumers can
contest debts and restrict collection processes. Fourth,
the rulemaking would impose new regulations on the
methods and content of permissible communications
with debtors in light of changes in communications
technology since the FDCPA was enacted. Fifth, the CFPB
would clarify what constitutes unfair, deceptive, or abusive debt collection practices. Sixth, the CFPB is considering new rules regarding communications by creditors
and the collection of debts that are outside of the applicable statute of limitations. Seventh, the CFPB is considering reforms to the debt collection litigation process,
particularly focusing on the perceived problems of inconvenient venue for debtors and the propensity of debt
collection litigation to result in default judgments. Finally, the CFPB is proposing certain regulatory and recordkeeping requirements designed to smooth the coherence
of federal law with state law and regulation and to better
regulate and supervise debt collectors on an ongoing basis.
In short, after decades of legislation, regulation,
enforcement, and analysis, the debt collection industry,
especially with respect to third-party entities such as collectors and debt buyers, is heavily regulated at both the
national and the state levels. The CFPB should take into
account the extensive existing regulations as it assesses
whether the marginal benefits of further regulation will
exceed the marginal cost for consumers.
IV. UNDERSTANDING THE ECONOMICS OF DEBT
COLLECTION AND ITS REGULATION

As the CFPB deliberates on whether to add new
debt collection regulations or to modify existing regulations, it should begin by considering the role of debt collection in the operation of the overall consumer credit
11 Debt Collection (Regulation F), supra note 1, at 67854-56.
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system. Only after understanding how consumer credit
contracts and debt collection function should the CFPB
consider the potential for regulation to improve the operation of the system.
A. The Economics of Consumer Credit Contractsand
Collection Practices
For a lender to make a loan profitably, it must be
able to price the risk of loss accurately. 0 Therefore, if the
risk of loss is higher, a lender will need to charge a higher price to compensate for the heightened risk of loss. If
the lender is unable to accurately price the risk of the
loan, such as because of regulatory limits, then the lender will reduce its risk exposure either by lending to fewer
borrowers, in particular, by limiting credit offered to
higher-risk borrowers, or by lending less to the same
borrowers by reducing credit lines and loan size.
One element of the risk of loss is the ability to collect from a debtor who defaults. If collection powers are
weaker, the loss rate will be higher, for two reasons.
First, if the creditor is more limited in its ability to collect, it will recover less from the defaulted debtor and
collection efforts will be costlier. Second, if the consequences of default are less severe, borrowers will be
more likely to default. As a result, greater restraints on
the ability of creditors to collect will tend to increase
their losses. In turn, lenders will respond to this increased risk of loss by raising prices to compensate or by
reducing risk exposure.
As an a priori matter, therefore, it is not clear
whether consumers as a whole will be made better or
worse off by stricter regulation of collections. Although
consumers who are already in default generally will benefit from greater restraints on collections, the benefit will
come at the expense of other consumers who may end

6o See The Condition of Small Business and Commercial Real Estate
Lending in Local Markets: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Serv.
and Comm. on Small Bus., 111th Cong. 3 (Feb. 26, 2010) (testimony
of Todd J. Zywicki, George Mason University and Mercatus Center),
http://mercatus.org/publication/condition-small-business-andcommercial-real-estate-lending-local-markets.
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up paying more or obtaining less access to credit, including the borrower currently in default, who may want new
credit in the future. Because at the time of making a loan
a lender cannot perfectly predict which particular borrowers will eventually default, all potential borrowers
will be forced to pay higher costs for credit, but especially riskier borrowers. 1 Conversely, weakening creditor
remedies will increase the risk of loss for creditors,
thereby raising the cost of lending. Such a reform will
lead to a reduced supply of lending and higher prices,
everything else being equal.62
Strengthening restrictions on creditor remedies,
therefore, will simultaneously shift the supply curve inward by increasing the loss rate and thus the cost of
lending, and the demand curve outward by increasing
consumer demand as a result of smaller adverse consequences from default. As shown in Figure 1, the overall
effect of the simultaneous increase in demand and reduction in supply from regulatory or contractual restrictions on debt collection is ambiguous in terms of the
overall
quantity
of
credit.

"ISee

Joseph E. Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss, Credit Rationing in Markets
with Imperfect Information, 71 AM. ECON. REv. 393 (1981). For example, although credit scores can predict a propensity for default, they
are probabilistic among those in a particular credit score range and
thus they imperfectly predict default for particular borrowers. Thus,
all potential borrowers within that credit score range will pay a similar risk premium.
62 At the extreme, the terms of a loan could be made entirely unenforceable on default. In such a world, some lending actively would
likely still occur because of the presence of extralegal restraints on
default, such as the constraints of repeat dealing, reputation, morality, conscience, collateral, economic hostage taking, or lending between family members. See Anthony T. Kronman, ContractLaw and
the State of Nature, 1 J.L. EcON. & ORG. 5 (1985). The supply of credit
would be much lower in a world without enforceable contracts.
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Figure 1: Effect of Restrictions on Debt Collection
Remedies
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As shown in Figure 1, placing stricter limits on
creditors' remedies will cause supply to shift in from Si
to S2 while also increasing consumer demand from D1 to
D2. Overall quantity shifts from Q1 to Q2, illustrated
here as a reduction in the equilibrium quantity amount.
But, in theory, the increase in demand could exceed the
reduction in supply if consumers valued the ability to be
free from certain potential remedies more than creditors
valued access to those remedies, even though the nominal price of credit, such as interest rates or down payments, were higher.63
63 To

put the matter differently, although the nominal price of credit
includes obvious price terms, such as the interest rate or down
payment, the full price of credit would also include other elements
of the loan, such as creditor collection rights on default. Thus, con-
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As a result of these offsetting adjustments, it is
unclear as an a priori matter whether tighter restrictions
on creditor collection remedies will increase consumer
welfare. Because the total price to consumers includes
the contingent costs associated with default, consumers
may be willing to pay more on some margins, such as a
higher interest rate, to prevent creditors from having access to certain remedies, assuming that they value those
protections more highly than their costs. If the marginal
benefit to consumers of avoiding a particular remedy is
larger than the marginal cost in terms of the higher price
they must pay to compensate the lender for the heightened risk of loss, then the equilibrium level of credit and
consumer welfare will be higher even if interest rates are
higher.' As economists John Umbeck and Robert Chatfield describe the tradeoff:
The most significant cost of an additional remedy to the lender is the decline in the borrower's
demand for a credit contract as the remedy
shifts more of the risk to him. Wealth maximizing creditors will weigh the gains and costs of
adding an extra remedy to a standardized contract and their resulting behavior is predictable
through the use of an economic model.5

suners might be willing to pay a higher interest rate in some cases
to be relieved of the risk of certain creditor remedies. For example,
interest rates on secured credit are lower than unsecured credit because of the lender's enhanced collection rights on default. Notwithstanding this lower interest rate, a consumer might prefer to use unsecured credit for many purposes.
For example, although eliminating a harsh remedy such as debtor's prisons might increase the risk of loss for lenders, it would also
increase potential borrowers' demand for credit by freeing such borrowers from the risk of that severe consequence if they default. Access to personal bankruptcy similarly increases the risk (and cost) of
lending while at the same time increasing the demand for credit. It is
unclear as an a priori matter whether these offsetting adjustments
will produce a higher or lower equilibrium level of credit.
65John Umbeck & Robert E. Chatfield, The Structure of Contracts and
Transaction Costs, 14 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING, 511, 513 (1982).
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In a competitive market, leaving aside potential
market failure issues, this analysis implies that lenders
would voluntarily agree to exclude from their contracts
the right to invoke remedies that borrowers wished to
avoid, provided that the borrowers were willing to pay a
higher interest rate to compensate for the increased risk
of loss.66 In a competitive market characterized by full information and low transaction costs, the end result
would be to produce the efficient combination of price
and collection terms for credit.
B. The Regulation of Collection Practices:An
Economic Perspective
Given that, regulation will improve on the competitive market outcome only when (1) there is an identifiable market failure, and (2) a regulation can be implemented in practice that will address the market failure in
a manner such that the benefits exceed the costs, including all unintended benefits and costs.
The effects of regulation on the terms of consumer
credit, including remedies available on default, typically
fall into two categories: intended and unintended effects.
Intended effects are the easiest to observe; if legislators
or regulators limit or prohibit a term or practice in a
consumer credit contract, law-abiding lenders reduce
their use of it. For example, where states place usury restrictions on the interest rates that creditors are permitted to charge on a loan, experience indicates that creditors do, in fact, abide by those limits and charge at or
below the statutory maximum.67
However, regulation of consumer credit terms often has several unintended consequences. Those unintended effects can generally be grouped under three
headings: (1) term repricing, (2) product substitution,
and (3) rationing, where debtors either lose access to cer-

This analysis is oversimplified because it ignores potential problems of adverse selection and moral hazard, but it is intended to illustrate that at the margin lenders should be willing to trade off a
willingness to surrender the right to invoke certain remedies as long
as they are adequately compensated for the heightened risk of loss.
67

See DURKIN ETAL., supra note 22, at 486-506.
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tain types of credit or experience a reduction in credit
lines and the amount of credit available. 8 Term repricing
refers to the practice of offsetting any terms that are
regulated below market levels by adjusting other terms
of the contract to try to reestablish the equilibrium price
and quantity. For example, lenders could respond to usury ceilings on interest rates by requiring a larger down
payment or extending the loan maturity; for a credit
card, the issuer could assess an annual fee.6 9 Productsubstitution describes the evasion of credit regulations by
shifting to products that are unequally regulated. For example, if consumers are unable to obtain credit cards because of regulatory limits, many consumers will turn to
more expensive and less preferred alternatives such as
payday loans or pawnshops. Rationing refers to the market adjustment that consumers experience from losing
access to legal credit, generally as a result of regulation.
The individual thereby may live without credit and its
benefits, or may turn to alternatives such as illegal loan
sharks. Reducing the supply of credit or making it more
expensive does not eliminate demand. In the absence of
a market failure that can be addressed by regulation,
new regulation makes consumers worse off by forcing
them to use different terms, products, and quantities
from those they prefer.
Restrictions on creditors' remedies generally have
the same effect as other types of regulatory controls on
credit terms. Because making debt collection costlier and
less effective raises the risk of lending, lenders would be
expected to offset strict debt collection rules through a
variety of adjustments. Those adjustments may include
increasing interest rates, increasing the size of down
payments, or inducing consumers to substitute alternative products that are less affected by restrictions on
creditor remedies. For example, lenders might induce
' See Todd J. Zywicki, The Market for Information and Credit Card
Regulation, 28 BANKING& FIN. SERVS. POL'Y REP. 13 (2009).
69 See Todd J. Zywicki, The Economics of Credit Cards, 3 CHAP. L. REV.
79 (2000); see also Robert L. Clarke & Todd J. Zywicki, Payday Lending, Bank Overdraft Protection,and Fair Competition at the Consumer FinancialProtection Bureau, 33 REv. BANKING & FIN. L. 235 (20132014).
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high-income borrowers to shift from unsecured credit,
such as credit cards, to secured credit, such as home equity lines of credit. Lower-income borrowers might be
forced to shift from credit cards to products such as
payday loans and pawn shops. Alternatively, lenders will
ration access to credit, resulting in an overall decrease in
the quantity of credit. Such rationing is done by cutting
off lending to higher-risk borrowers or reducing the size
of credit lines for all consumers. As economist Douglas
Greer summarized in the conclusions of the National
Commission on Consumer Finance studies in the 1970s:
When an important sanction is prohibited or
significantly restricted, creditors compensate for
the increased risk burden they consequently carry by introducing more stringent standards of
applicant acceptability and/or raising rates of
charge. In connection with sales credit this also
means that larger down payments will be required and perhaps shorter maturities as well.
Although virtually all consumers would be thus
affected by such market changes, the most greatly affected would be the relatively poor and least
credit worthy, so if such restrictions or prohibitions are imposed for the sake of these latter
people, it is not self-evident that they will gain a
net benefit by such action. It follows that the
credit problems of the poor and those subject to
cyclical unemployment are not necessarily
solved by the curtailment of collections sanctions ....

70

Subsequent empirical studies have confirmed the
observation that prohibiting creditors from using useful
remedies in the event of default typically results in higher costs and less access to credit, with higher-risk bor70Douglas

F. Greer, CreditorsRemedies and ContractualProvisions:A

Legal and Economic Analysis of Consumer Credit Collections, in 5
TECHNICAL STUDIES OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CONSUMER FINANCE

154 (1973).
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rowers being affected most. For example, a 1983 study
by Barth, Gotur, Manage, and Yezer examines accountlevel data on unsecured personal loans originated by
nine large consumer finance companies that accounted
for about 40% of personal lending by finance companies
at that time.7" The study finds a correlation between access to collection remedies and interest rates: interest
rates are lower when certain remedies are permitted, and
higher when they are not. Moreover, the statistical effect
is continuous in nature, meaning that both the size and
the availability of the allowed remedies, such as the allowed size of late fees or garnishments, matter as well.
In a follow-up study of 5,000 personal loans, Barth,
Cordes, and Yezer confirm the initial findings regarding
the economic effects of restricting creditors remedies. In
this study, having fewer legal restrictions on available
remedies was associated with a lower interest rate.72
Moreover, the study finds that although consumers express a willingness to pay higher prices for credit to exclude certain creditor remedies on default, the amount
that they are willing to pay to avoid those remedies is
smaller than the amount that creditors would raise prices in response to losing useful collection powers. For example, Barth et al. estimate that for every dollar reduction in the size of allowable late fees, lenders will
increase the annual percentage rate (APR)'on the loan by
2.2 percentage points; however, borrowers will value a
dollar reduction in late fees at only 0.045 percentage
points. 73 Also, consumers are willing to pay an APR that

is 0.0045 percentage points higher in exchange for a tendollar reduction in the allowed garnishment amount;
however, the authors estimate that creditors will increase
the APR by 0.65 percentage points for each ten-dollar reduction in allowed garnishment. 4 Thus, Barth et al. find
11James

R. Barth et al., The Effect of Government Regulation of Personal Loan Markets: A Tobit Estimation of a Microeconomic Model, 38
J. FIN. 1233 (Sept. 1983).
72 James R. Barth, Joseph J. Cordes & Anthony M. J. Yezer, Benefits
and Costs of Legal Restrictions on PersonalLoan Markets, 29 J.L. &
EcON. 357 (1986).
11Id. at 377.
74

Id.
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that although borrowers might be willing to pay higher
costs for credit to restrict certain creditor remedies,
those amounts are often statistically insignificant and
very small-much smaller than the size of the price increases that creditors require to compensate for loss of
access to those remedies. The findings suggest that because the value that borrowers place on avoiding the
remedies is less than the price of excluding them, creditors act efficiently to retain access to those particular
remedies in their contracts, and state regulations that
limited access to the remedies cost borrowers more than
they want to pay.
A study published by William Dunkelberg in 1978
finds evidence that stricter regulation of creditor remedies results in higher prices and lower levels of credit for
consumers. 5 In 1973, the state of Wisconsin enacted the
Wisconsin Consumer Act (WCA), which, among other
things, imposed substantial new limits on the remedies
available to creditors on a consumer's default. Many of
these limits anticipated the FTC's credit practices rule,
which had been proposed but not finalized at that point.
The WCA contained several provisions related to creditors' remedies, including limits on wage garnishment and
credit insurance, prohibitions on wage assignment and
the recovery of certain creditor collection costs such as
attorneys' fees, limits on seizure of collateral without an
opportunity for judicial process, and prohibitions on the
taking of a non-purchase-money security interest in
household goods to secure any loan of less than $1,000.76

Dunkelberg sent surveys to several hundred banks
following the enactment of the WCA to see whether the
Act changed any elements of the banks' lending behavior.77 He reports that 46% of the banks he surveyed indicated that they had changed their lending policies in the
period since the enactment of the law. 7 Dunkelberg

states that the banks responded to the regulations in a
number of ways. Of those that changed their lending pol71 William

C. Dunkelberg, Banks Lending Response to Restricted Creditor Remedies (Credit Research Ctr. Working Paper No. 20, 1978).
716Id. at 56, appendix D (summarizing terms of the WCA).
77 Of these banks, 186 responded to the survey. Id. at 8.
78 Id. at 9.
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icies, 41% said that they had tightened credit standards,
making fewer loans to "marginal borrowers." Twenty
percent restricted loan maturities or the type or size of
loans available. For example, because the WCA increased
the costs of collection, some banks discontinued making
small loans. Some of the costs of servicing delinquent
loans do not vary proportionally with loan size-that is,
the cost of making a phone call or drafting a letter is
more or less the same for a loan of $200 or $2,000. As a
result, if collection costs increased, there would be some
minimum loan value amount below which ,it would not
be economical to collect in the event of default. Alternatively, banks would cease making small loans to riskier
borrowers, which some banks did as well. Some banks
stopped making loans for household goods in response
to new limits on the ability to seize collateral. Moreover,
11% of respondents said that they had increased interest
rates, fees, or other costs such as down payment requirements. Although the general economic conditions
and high interest rates of the early 1970s contributed to
those policy changes, a majority-or in some instances a
substantial minority-of banks identified the regulatory
changes as a primary cause of their changes.
As Dunkelberg summarizes his findings:
The focus of this study has been the response of
banks to lending regulations. The ultimate concern, however, is not the impact on banks, but
on consumers who own and use banks, and in
particular, on those who borrow from banks.
Based on the reported changes, consumers
found that (at least some) rates were higher or
terms were less favorable, that some types of
loans (collateralized, especially on household
goods) were harder to obtain (some banks discontinued particular loan types, forcing customers to search elsewhere), and that it was harder
to qualify for a loan. Not all customers were affected equally, the "marginal" borrower being
most likely affected by higher rates and higher
credit standards.
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The debtor with payment difficulties presumably
found things a little easier (although, [with]
weaker remedies, lenders may initiate collection
efforts sooner in order to avoid a more serious
delinquency). The time between default and repossession was increased, leaving the consumer
with the use of the item in question for a longer
period. The delinquent debtor was no longer liable for many legal fees. In more cases, the lender
may have given up collection of the debt, especially if the ... expected recovery was small
compared to expected legal fees. [This] resulted
in a transfer of wealth to the delinquent debtor.7 9

A recent study by economist Viktar Fedaseyeu confirms the standard economic analysis that mandatory restrictions on creditor collections have an overall adverse
effect on consumers' access to credit.80 Fedaseyeu created a database that rates the strictness of states' collection laws and the effect on access to consumer credit in
each state. He finds that stricter regulation of third-party
debt collectors results in a lower level of credit card collections in each state (9% lower on average for each additional restriction on debt collection activity) and that this
circumstance leads to a decrease of 2.2% in the number
of new revolving lines of credit for consumers.
Although the details of some of those studies are
dated, they point out the timeless economic warning that
careful cost-benefit analysis is needed before undertaking efforts to impose new regulations on collections.
Consumers in default might benefit from restrictions on
certain remedies (although, as will be discussed, even
this outcome is not obvious), but all consumers will end
up paying higher prices for credit and gaining less access
Id. at 29.
Viktar Fedaseyeu, Debt Collection Agencies and the Supply of Consumer Credit (Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila., Working Paper No. 13-38,
2013).
79

80
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to credit, especially higher-risk and lower-income consumers. This admonition is especially pressing today because the effect of additional regulations combined with
earlier generations of similar regulations will be cumulative. Given that earlier regulatory vintages captured
much of the "low-hanging fruit" of limitations that were
most likely to have a net positive effect for consumers
and the economy, the CFPB should proceed carefully to
ensure that the marginal
benefits of its regulations ex81
ceed the marginal costs.

C. The Effects of Debt Collection Regulation on
Higher-Risk Borrowers
Inefficient regulation of creditor remedies can also
have distributive effects. As Dunkelberg notes in his
study, higher-risk borrowers are most adversely affected
by the higher interest rates and stricter lending standards imposed by lenders in response to tighter limits on
debt collection." Hynes and Posner note another regressive distributional effect: restrictions on remedies affect
unsecured credit more severely than they do secured
credit, which increases the cost to consumers of unseIt is theoretically possible that some restrictions on creditor's
remedies can be efficient for some consumers in some contexts. For
example, Villegas finds that restrictions on some remedies are associated with an increase in both the likelihood that a given consumer
will have access to credit and the likelihood that a higher overall
quantity of credit will be available. Daniel J. Villegas, Regulation of
81

CreditorPractices:An Evaluation of the FTC's CreditPracticeRule, 42

J.EcON. &Bus. 51 (1990). But he also finds that restricting other remedies has a negative impact on the amount of credit outstanding.
Thus, even though Villegas finds that some restrictions can increase
consumer demand more than they reduce lender supply, his results
are mixed. Moreover, the implications of Villegas's positive findings
may not be replicable in the current regulatory environment. Collection remedies are much more highly regulated today than they were
at the time of his study. Indeed, the remedies that Villegas's study
finds it efficient to regulate (nonpurchase money security interests
in household goods and garnishment) are now regulated; the task of
identifying additionalregulations for which the benefits to consumers exceed the costs will be very difficult.
82See Dunkelberg, supra note 74, and accompanying text.
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cured credit relative to secured credit.83 High-income
consumers are more likely to have access to assets that
can provide collateral for loans, such as home equity
loans. Creditors might also require cosigners before making a loan, a requirement that might further favor borrowers from higher-income backgrounds. As a result,
high-wealth and high-income borrowers may be able to
avoid the higher costs that accompany stricter limits on
creditor remedies by increasing their use of secured
credit.84 Low-income consumers, by contrast, will likely
be forced to turn to products such as payday loans and
pawnshops to meet their credit needs. In fact, reducing
access to credit by higher-risk borrowers could even benefit lower-risk borrowers by increasing the supply of
lending capital available for loans to them.85
In addition, there may be distributional consequences among borrowers who have different subjective
and heterogeneous preferences with respect to the types
of remedies that they are willing to accept on default. For
example, some consumers may be more tolerant or may
find different practices and remedies more useful than
others.86 Moreover, some borrowers simply place a higher
value in general on protection from creditor remedies
than do others. More important, research indicates that
borrowers who do place a higher value on restricting
creditor remedies are willing to compensate the lender
for the higher risk incurred by, for example, paying a
" Hynes & Poser, supra note 27.
Fedaseyeu finds that although stricter regulatory limits on creditors' remedies are associated with a reduction in access to unsecured debt, the limits have no effect on secured debt, consistent
with the theory that access to creditor remedies is more important
for unsecured debt than for secured debt. See Fedaseyeu, supra note
79, at 21. However, he does not directly test for a substitution effect
between unsecured and secured debt, because he examines changes
in auto loans and mortgages, neither of which seem to be close substitutes for credit card debt (as compared with a product such as a
home equity line of credit, which appears to be a closer substitute).
Thus, it is not clear that his findings are inconsistent with the predicted effect of increased substitution to secured debt over time.
8

15See DURKN ET AL., supra note 22, at 533.

See Gregory A. Falls & Debra Drecnik Worden, Consumer Valuation
of Protection from CreditorRemedies, 22 J. CONSUMER AFF. 20 (1988).
86
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higher interest rate or a higher down payment, or by adjusting other terms of the contract." Regulatory restrictions on collections, however, typically take the form
of mandatory rules that the parties cannot alter by contract; thus, even if borrowers agreed to permit access to
a particular remedy, in exchange for a lower interest rate,
for example, they would be prohibited from doing so. As
a result, consumers who are more sensitive to intensive
debt collection can force those who are less sensitive to
subsidize their preferences.
To the extent that the willingness to pay for such
restrictions reflects a higher subjective willingness to default, the restrictions limit the ability of relatively lowrisk borrowers to signal their creditworthiness and thus
create a pooling equilibrium among relatively lower-risk
and higher-risk borrowers. As a result, lower-risk borrowers subsidize higher-risk borrowers. In turn, the limitation on the ability of lower-risk borrowers to signal
their relatively creditworthy status and to be rewarded
through lower costs of borrowing can drive those consumers out of the relevant market as they substitute
other products, such as secured credit, for which the distorting effects of the regulation are not as costly.
V. MARKET FAILURE ARGUMENTS FOR REGULATION OF
CONSUMER DEBT COLLECTION
As noted, regulation typically is thought to be jus-

tified in consumer credit markets in which (1) there is an
identifiable market failure, and (2) a regulation can be

implemented in practice that will address the market
failure in such a manner that the benefits exceed the
costs, including all unintended benefits and costs.

Several theories of market failure assert why contracting between consumers and lenders may be prone to
market failures that harm consumers. In contrast, both
theoretical arguments and empirical evidence cast doubt
on the theoretical claims of market failures. Moreover,
empirical evidence suggests that many interventions impose costs on consumers that exceed their benefits-

87

Id.
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perhaps reflecting the absence of a market failure in the
first place.
A. Possible Market Failuresin Consumer Credit Contracts
Advocates of stricter regulation of creditor collection practices identify several claimed market failures in
the debt collection market that they believe support
heightening regulation. Many of these arguments made
today reprise arguments made in the past, most notably
in the context of promulgating the FTC's credit practices
rule in 1985.88 Therefore, although very few rigorous
studies of the effect of regulation of debt collection have
been made in recent years, most of the key issues in today's debates have been the subject of extensive study in
the past.
In connection with issuing the credit practices rule,
the FTC identified three sources of potential market failure in contracting between consumer borrowers and
lenders over remedies.89 First, the FTC argued that regulation of debt collection practices can potentially redress
problems of unequal bargaining power in consumer credit markets, which supposedly allow lenders to propose
"contracts of adhesion" that force borrowers to accept
contracts with harsh remedy provisions on a take-it-orleave-it basis. Second, the FTC argued that regulation is
supposed to protect borrowers who lack a full understanding of or information about the terms of collection
in their contracts. Third, the FTC argued that adverse selection may occur. According to this argument, competition forces creditors to offer only loans with harsh remedy terms because lenders who offer less harsh terms
will disproportionately attract higher-risk borrowers, a
situation that, in turn, will lead to higher loss rates.

88

See FTC staff, Unpublished Memorandum to Commissioners from

the Division of Special Projects, Bureau of Consumer Protection, in
3043 (1974). Although the rule was not finalized until 1985, consideration began a full decade earlier.
89 Additional purported market failures are alleged to be unique to
third-party debt collectors and debt buyers and are distinct from
these general concerns. Those arguments will be treated separately.
SUPPORT OF A TRADE REGULATION RULE TO LIMIT CREDITORS' REMEDIES
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Higher losses will then force lenders to charge higher interest rates and consequently drive away low-risk borrowers. Therefore, a lender that offers lenient default
terms will attract only higher-risk borrowers, leading to
an unraveling of its customer risk pool. To prevent this
situation, each lender will insist on default and collection
terms that are relatively harsher than its competitors'
terms. However, because each lender has the same incentive, it is feared that all lenders will converge on the
harshest set of terms, even if those terms are more aggressive than the terms that lenders and borrowers
would actually prefer. Thus, the uncoordinated activity
of creditors might produce a market equilibrium composed of inefficiently harsh terms that actually reduce
the overall volume of credit because the reduction in
consumer demand exceeds the supply-side effects of reduced lending losses. 90
An analysis of each of the three purported theoretical rationales for regulation exposes the problems in
each and illustrates the need for caution and careful
cost-benefit analysis before imposing new regulations.
The following analysis will focus on the first two rationales because they are more commonly advanced today as
arguments for regulation: that consumers are forced to
accept unfair terms regarding collections because they
hold unequal bargaining power on a take-it-or-leave-it
basis and that consumers are not fully aware of the remedies available to creditors because they lack information
or fail to pay attention.
In justifying the credit practices rule, the FTC asserted that the imbalance in bargaining power between
creditors and borrowers meant that consumer lenders
uniformly demanded that borrowers permit them to use
all remedies permitted under law. As the FTC wrote,
"[t]he contracts reflect each company's undeviating policy of laying claim to all possible contractual remedies.
The industry's unitary approach to this matter precludes
Note that the second and third theoretical rationales for regulation
are mutually contradictory, because the adverse selection rationale
for regulation is predicated on the assumption that borrowers are
aware of and base their borrowing decisions in part on the default
terms offered by competing lenders.
90
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any consumer so disposed from shopping for a loan
agreement which dispenses with harsher remedies."91 In
addition, the FTC asserted that every consumer credit
contract "contains a complete catalogue of any and all
contractual devices." It continued, "[t]he extent to which
the creditor arms himself with collection tools depends
in no way on any knowledge he may have gained concerning the particular circumstance of a given debtor; the
complete inventory of remedies is recited in every contract, and they are completely nonnegotiable."92 The FTC
provided no evidence to support those factual claims.
The CFPB's Debt Collection ANPR echoes the FTC's
arguments, focusing mainly on the claim that consumers
lack adequate information about collection terms in contracts. Although consumers might pay attention to certain terms of their contracts, such as the interest rate,
the CFPB argues that they might not pay adequate attention to contract terms governing default and collections.
The CFPB states:
Typically, competition in markets will incentivize
firms to provide products and services on terms
that consumers favor, but this competition may
not be effective with regard to collections practices. . . . If firms' collection practices-or the
practices of third-party collectors employed by
the creditors or the buyers to whom creditors
sell debt-played an important role in consumers' borrowing or purchasing decisions, then this
competition would impose some discipline on
firms to reduce overly aggressive tactics. When
consumers make borrowing or purchasing decisions, however, they may not be focused on the
risk that they will default.93
That lack of attention could enable lenders to exploit
consumers by imposing stricter collection terms than
91FTC staff, supra note 87, at 16-17.
92 Id.

at 36. The FTC's report was highly controversial at the time and

spawned substantial study to assess its claims. See Letsou, supra
note 23, at 614-15.
11 FTC staff, supra note 87, at 36.
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consumers would agree to if they were fully informed. If
so, then regulation could theoretically improve consumer
welfare by addressing that market failure.
B. Economic Analysis of Market FailureArguments
Despite the intuitive appeal of the CFPB's arguments, theoretical and empirical evidence do not support
the conclusion that market failure is present with respect
to debt collection remedies. Moreover, because they track
arguments made by the FTC in the past, many of the
claims have already been studied by economists.
1. Theoretical Analysis with Market Failure Arguments
Consider first the argument that consumer credit
contracts are contracts of adhesion that are offered to
consumers on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. This argument is
problematic on several levels. For one thing, it suggests
that all terms of a consumer credit contract should be
dictated by lenders, not just collection terms. Yet interest rates and other terms on consumer loans are set by
the forces of supply and demand and are not dictated to

consumers by creditors. 94 If lenders do possess bargain-

ing power over borrowers, it is not clear why they would
use that power only to oppress the small number of consumers who default rather than using their alleged power to oppress all borrowers through higher interest rates
or other loan terms. In short, as a theoretical supposition, the argument that consumer credit contracts are
contracts of adhesion does not hold together because it
fails to explain why an imbalance in bargaining power
would be exercised only with respect to the collection
terms of the contract.
To distinguish remedies terms from other terms of
a consumer credit contract, such as the interest rate,
therefore, one must turn to the argument stressed by the
CFPB that consumers do not pay adequate attention to
collection terms, focusing instead on other terms of the
contract, such as interest rates. In modern parlance, in94

See DURKIN ET AL., supra note 22, at 509-11 (summarizing studies).
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terest rate terms are said to be "salient" to consumers,
and therefore are terms that they notice, understand,
and take into consideration in their decision making. Collection terms, however, are claimed to be not salient and
thus do not receive sufficient attention and consideration from consumers when they shop among competing
credit offers.9" If this distinction between salient and
non-salient terms were valid, then creditors could exploit
consumers by imposing harsh collection terms without
the borrowers knowing about those terms. In that case,
the terms would perform no risk-based pricing function
in the contract but would operate solely to redistribute
wealth from ignorant consumers to lenders. If so, a corollary implication would be that banning or restricting
access by creditors to certain terms could provide increased protection for consumers without a compensating increase in price or restriction in credit access.
However, the theoretical argument that low consumer awareness produces a market failure is flawed for
at least two reasons. First, as noted, empirical evidence
overwhelmingly demonstrates that when access to collection remedies is restricted, prices, such as interest rates
and down payments, increase and the overall equilibrium
quantity of credit declines. That there is a supply effect
in response to those limits suggests that lenders view
those terms as performing a risk-pricing function, and
that when such terms are prohibited, lenders adjust other terms of the contract. If, however, the terms were inserted without any awareness by consumers, it would
follow that no change would be made to interest rates or
quantity supplied.
Second, economists have long understood that it is
not necessary for every consumer to be aware of and to
shop on particular terms in a contract for the market to

91See Thomas A. Durkin, Gregory Elliehausen & Todd J. Zywicki, An
Assessment of Behavioral Law and Economics Contentions and What
We Know Empirically About Credit Card Use by Consumers, 22 S. CT.
ECON. REv. 1 (2015) (describing and critiquing the theory of term salience in credit card contracts).
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produce welfare-enhancing outcomes for consumers."
Few consumers know all of the attributes of a car, dishwasher, or television, yet market outcomes are generally
assumed to be welfare enhancing, and prices are set
competitively. Consumer decisions about credit cards or
mortgages are not fundamentally different from decisions related to any other complex consumer product.
If sellers are unable to accurately distinguish
among thorough shoppers, moderately informed shoppers, and consumers who do not shop around, all consumers need not be highly informed for an efficient outcome to result.97 Firms that try to exploit low-information
shoppers by offering inferior contracts will lose the
business of informed customers; thus, a critical mass of
consumers who actually do shop around will lead firms
to offer the same contracts to all customers. Consumers
who are informed provide a positive pecuniary externality to those who are not, essentially protecting not just
themselves but also those who do not shop around. In
fact, as few as one-third of consumers need to shop
around for the market to generate a competitive equilibrium that benefits all consumers. 98 Moreover, although
standard form contracts are often characterized as being
unfriendly to consumers by limiting their ability to bargain over particular terms, Schwartz and Wilde argue
that standard form contracts may benefit consumers by
reducing origination costs, facilitating comparison

96 See

Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract Terms: The Examples of Warrantiesand Security Interests, 69 VA. L. REv. 1387 (1983) [hereinafter Schartz & Wilde, Im-

perfect Information].; Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in
Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic
Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 630 (1979) [hereinafter Schartz & Wilde,
Intervening in Markets]. See also Steven Salop & Joseph Stiglitz, Bargains and Ripoffs: A Model of Monopolistically Competitive Price Dispersion, 44 REv. ECON. STUD. 493 (1977); Louis L. Wilde, Labor Market

Equilibrium Under Nonsequential Search, 16 J. ECON. THEORY 373
(1977); Michael Rothschild, Models of Market Organizationwith Im-

perfect
Information:A Survey, 81 J. POL. EcON. 1283 (1973).
97
DURKIN ET AL., supra note 22, at 524.

98

See Schwartz & Wilde, Intervening in Markets, supra note 95.
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among contracts, and making lender discrimination more
difficult. 99

2. Empirical Analysis of Market Failure Arguments about
Consumer Contracting
Empirical evidence also fails to support market
failure theories about contract terms. In fact, creditors
do not insist that contracts include all remedies permitted by law, as the FTC had asserted. In one of the technical studies performed for the National Commission on
Consumer Finance in 1974, economist Douglas Greer reviews contracts provided by more than 1,000 providers
of consumer financial services, including banks, finance
companies, and retail stores. 100 Greer finds that credit
contracts do not reserve blanket remedy provisions to
lenders nor do all remedies appear to be required on a
take-it-or-leave-it basis. He finds instead that contracts
typically reserve only those remedies that lenders think
are most effective, such as repossession of collateral for
purchase-money consumer goods and payment of the
lender's attorney's fees, and those remedies that consumers think are most acceptable. By contrast, remedies
that are controversial and that consumers especially dislike, such as confession of judgment provisions, are rarely found in consumer credit contracts. Greer also finds
wide variation among lenders in different industries as
to the presence of certain remedies, and in fact, he even
finds variation among different types of loans within a
99 Id. See also Schwartz & Wilde, Imperfect Information, supra note

95.

100Douglas F. Greer, An EmpiricalAnalysis of the PersonalLoan Mar-

ket, in 4 TECHNICAL STUDIES OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CONSUMER
FINANCE (1974). Greer's analysis predated many of the modern con-

sumer protection laws that have been enacted since; thus, his study
includes several remedies that subsequently have been banned or
restricted. What is relevant for the contemporary debate, however, is
not the particular remedies that Greer studied, but the dynamics of
the overall contracting process as to whether creditors uniformly
require borrowers to contractually agree to permit the creditor all

remedies available by law in the event of a default or instead whether the mix of remedies approximates those that consumers would
willingly pay for.
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given industry, rebutting the assertion that creditors
universally demand blanket access to all remedies allowed by law.'0' In addition, he finds that even when certain remedies are permitted by the contract, lenders do
not typically avail themselves of all available contract
remedies in practice. Thus, not only do creditors not insist on reserving their right to exercise all collection
powers on default, but also, when actually collecting,
they do not avail themselves of all the powers they preserved in the contract.
Economist Richard Peterson provides a general
model of economic factors that generalizes Greer's findings. 102 Peterson hypothesizes that although access to
collection remedies provides a benefit to creditors by reducing losses and defaults, exercising those remedies
has costs as well. He identifies three costs that retrain
creditor behavior in bargaining for and later exercising
particular remedies: (1) the costs associated with invoking a remedy; (2) forgone payments that the borrower
would have voluntarily resumed; and (3) loss of goodwill,
such as the loss of future business resulting from a reputation for using unduly harsh or overreaching creditor
remedies.
Therefore, although intensive collection efforts
benefit creditors by reducing their losses, direct and indirect costs from collecting debts and taking different
types of actions will have different costs and benefits.
Creditors will avail themselves only of those remedies
for which the marginal benefits exceed the marginal
costs. For example, although a single telephone call may
be relatively inexpensive, it could have potentially large
or small benefit in terms of facilitating recovery depending on the context. If, for example, a consumer simply
has forgotten to pay a bill, a telephone call could be a
101 For

example, in the study, acceleration clauses are more common

for banks and finance company contracts than for retailers, but
among retailer contracts, acceleration clauses are much more common for revolving credit contracts than for installment loans. Id.
102 See Richard L. Peterson, Creditors' Use of Collection Remedies, 9 J.
FiN. RES. 71 (Spring 1986).
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low-cost means of collecting by reminding the borrower
that payment is due. In many other cases, however, a telephone call will be ineffective. By contrast, although a
successful lawsuit would likely, in most cases, greatly facilitate collection, formal court proceedings are expensive and slow, and risk loss of goodwill to the lender.
In practice, both contracting and collection activities implicitly recognize this economic logic. Creditors
pursue a sliding scale of collection practices and will invoke those remedies that have the highest net present
value in terms of weighing the marginal benefits of exercising particular remedies against the cost of doing so.
Collection actions will be taken only if the expected benefits exceed the expected costs."3 Collection efforts thus
will begin with the least expensive collection methods
available, such as a letter or phone call, and then escalate
to more intensive methods, such as a lawsuit or repossession of collateral, only if the expected marginal benefit of these more intensive collection methods exceeds
the expected marginal costs. As Greer observes in his
study for the National Commission on Consumer Finance:
The particular policy of creditors vary widely...
but it seems safe to say that many if not most of
them attempt to obtain payment in a stepwise
process which employs the least costly means of
personal contact first, followed by more and
more costly techniques if the delinquency is enduring enough to cross each threshold of the
pursuit." ' 4
In fact, the CFPB itself implicitly recognizes the continued relevance of this dynamic, noting for example that
for small-dollar debts, such as utility, medical, or telecommunications bills, even contacting the consumer may
not be cost-effective, stating,"consequently some collectors simply report these items to consumer reporting
103

See Richard M. Hynes, Broke but Not Bankrupt: Consumer Debt

Collection in State Courts,60 FLA. L. REv. 1, 56-60 (2008).
10 Greer, supra note 69, at 151.
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agencies (CRAs) and wait for the consumer to contact the
collector after discovering the item on a credit report."10
Peterson also finds that consumers hold strong
opinions about collection practices, and those practices
that consumers consider most acceptable tend to match
those that Greer identifies as most effective for lenders. 106 Conversely, most of the remedies that lenders consider ineffective are among those that consumers dislike
most, such as nonpurchase money security interests in
household goods, wage assignments, and confession of
judgment. If lenders find a remedy to be effective but
disliked by consumers, they use the remedy infrequently,
reflecting solicitude for consumer preferences. In a conclusion that continues to resonate today, Peterson states:
The results suggest that state and federal legislators who consider restricting creditor practices
in the future must determine whether they are
attempting to correct a problem that is more apparent than real. ... Legislators must also ask
themselves if the restriction of credit practices
useful to lenders will add sufficiently to the social welfare to compensate for the reduction to
consumers of the quantity of credit available. 17
C. PotentialUnintended Consequences of Regulating Debt
Collection Practicesfor Delinquent Consumers
Because creditors exercise their remedies in this
stepwise and economically predictable fashion, regulation of collection practices can potentially have unintended consequences for consumers that go beyond the
macro considerations of the effects on access to credit.
Regulation interrupts the organic process of gradual escalation of the use of various remedies, thus harming
consumers by potentially leading creditors to use more
expensive and more intensive collection practices.

10S
Debt Collection (Regulation F), supra note 1, at 67850.
'o6

Peterson, supra note 101, at 85.

1071d.
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1. Unintended Consequences of Regulating Debt
Collection Practices
The fact that creditors escalate debt collection
practices according to a sliding scale implies a corollary
proposition: if lighter-touch and less expensive collection
efforts, such as telephone calls or written contacts, are
restricted or prohibited, creditors and collectors will escalate their collection efforts more rapidly to more intensive and more expensive collection techniques such
as lawsuits. Indeed, some consumer groups have asserted that the volume of litigation by creditors to collect
debts has increased in recent years.108 Two possible reasons might be heightened regulation and declining efficacy of lower-cost extralegal efforts to collect debts. For
example, creditors may have difficulty contacting consumers who have moved away from using traditional
mail and landline telephones for their communications.
Restrictions on particular remedies will have distributional consequences as well. Different types of lenders rely on different collection practices. For example,
collection of larger debts, such as credit card debts, may
justify escalation to more expensive collection methods,
whereas collection of smaller debts, such as utility bills,
may not. Regulation that limits the availability of less intensive means of collection and leads to rapid elevation
of more intensive and expensive procedures will thus
have a disproportionate negative impact on creditors
whose products and services tend to result in many
small unpaid debts rather than larger debts, whose collection justifies more expensive collection processes.
In addition, if small loans become uneconomical to
collect because of restrictions on low-cost collection
practices, then lenders also will likely respond by curtailing their willingness to make small loans. Indeed, Dunkelberg observes this behavior in his study of Wiscon-

108LISA STIFLER & LESLIE PARRISH, The State of Lending in America & its
Impact on U.S. Households, in DEBT COLLECTION & DEBT BUYING 9 (Center for Responsible Lending, April 2014).
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sin's consumer protection act. In the study, many lenders
reported that they would stop making smaller loans in
response to the increase in the costs of collecting relative
to the size of the loan.1 09 In such a scenario, some borrowers who qualify to borrow only small sums will lose
access to credit completely or will shift to alternative
types of loans such as payday loans. Others will be
forced to borrow a larger sum than they prefer, which
will raise their risk of subsequent default.110
2. Unintended Consequences of Interactions of Limits on
Collections with Substantive Regulations
Estimating the expected costs and benefits of debt
collection regulations is especially difficult because the
precise nature and magnitude of unintended consequences will depend not just on the rules governing debt
collections, but also on the interaction of debt collection
rules with other substantive rules, such as usury restrictions, that limit maximum interest rates. Because
substantive regulations, such as usury ceilings, vary from
state to state, the complexity of those interactions is especially important for federal regulators to consider.
For example, the unintended adverse effects for
consumers of limits on creditor remedies will be larger
when those rules are accompanied by usury ceilings on
interest rates.111 Lenders can address the risk of lending
either by reducing their expected losses from default or
by increasing the price of credit to offset higher expected

109

110

Dunkelberg, supra note 74.

See THOMAS A. DURKIN, GREGORY ELIJEHAUSEN & MIN HWANG, RATE

CEILINGS AND THE DISTRIBUION OF SMALL DOLLAR LOANS FROM CONSUMER

FINANCE COMPANIES: RESULTS OF A NEW SURVEY OF SMALL DOLLAR CASH

LENDERS
(Dec.
2,
2014),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2533143
(noting that the average loan size for personal finance loans is higher in
states with lower APR ceilings).
11 See William C. Dunkelberg & Robin De Magistris, Measuring the
Impact of Credit Regulation on Consumers, in THE REGULATION OF
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 44 (Fed. Res. Bank of Boston, Conference Series 21, 1979).
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losses. As a result, more vigorous collection efforts ex
post, to reduce losses, or higher interest rates ex ante, to
compensate for expected losses, are substitutes for each
other. In a competitive market, borrowers and lenders
would agree to the efficient combination of default and
price terms that would maximize the gains to trade between them, trading off default and price terms at the
margin and reaching the efficient quantity of credit.
Where regulation limits, for example, maximum interest
rates, the distortion of consumer credit markets can be
offset to some extent by using more intensive collection
efforts after default. Similarly, where remedies are limited, creditors can raise interest rates or adjust other
terms of the contract to compensate for increased losses
and delay in collection. Where, however, a state restricts
both remedies and prices simultaneously, those adjustments are constrained,
and a larger reduction in access
112
to credit will result.
VI. THE ROLE OF THIRD-PARTY DEBT BUYERS AND DEBT
COLLECTORS
Debt collection law traditionally has regulated
third-party debt collectors more stringently than it regulates lenders seeking to collect their own debts. For example, by its terms the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
applied only to third-party debt collectors, not to originating creditors.113 Most states also impose additional
regulations that specifically apply to third-party debt col114
lectors.
The CFPB argues that third-party debt collectors
and debt buyers may be prone to a unique type of market failure distinct from that claimed about creditors
generally. Namely, if the debt is sold or assigned to a
third party for collection, consumers have no ability to
shop for or choose the collector of their debt as they did

Peterson, supra note 101.
...
For a summary of the rationales for this limitation, see Hunt, Collecting Debt, supra note 25, at 19-20.
114 Id. at 21.
112
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for the original credit provider. Thus, whereas a consumer, at least in theory, could take into account the reputation of the original lender in deciding to enter into a contract-and could refuse to deal with that lender in the
future if he or she felt abused-the consumer has no
such power with a third-party collector. The CFPB argues
that this inability to exercise control over one's debt collector produces a market failure that suggests the propriety of regulation. As the CFPB contends,
While debt collection can benefit consumers by
reducing the price and increasing the availability
of credit, in the absence of legislation and regulation many consumers may be subject to debt
collection efforts that raise consumer protection
concerns. Typically, competition in markets will
incentivize firms to provide products and services on terms that consumers favor, but this
competition may not be effective with regard to
collections practices. Once a debt has gone into
collection, consumers cannot choose their collector; the relevant choice for the consumer came
when deciding from which firm to purchase or
borrow. If firms' collection practices-or the
practices of third-party collectors employed by
the creditors or the buyers to whom creditors
sell debt-played an important role in consumers' borrowing or purchasing decisions, then this
competition would impose some discipline on
firms to reduce overly aggressive tactics. When
consumers make borrowing or purchasing decisions, however, they may not be focused on the
risk that they will default. As a result, a consumer's decision to obtain credit from a particular
creditor is unlikely to be influenced by the identity of the collector that might eventually collect
on the debt if the consumer defaults. Indeed, it
is unlikely that the consumer and perhaps even
the creditor could know the identity of the future third-party collector. Firms therefore have a
limited incentive to engage in less aggressive tactics if those tactics lead to increased recovery of
debts. This effect may be exacerbated in the case
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of third-party collectors or debt buyers if consumers do not associate their treatment by the
collector or debt buyer with the original creditor. 115

CFPB Director Richard Cordray also has argued
that consumers are particularly vulnerable to overreach
by third-party collectors because the inability to choose
one's debt collector eliminates market checks on bad behavior:
When consumers have limited clout because they
do not choose the businesses they must deal
with, they lack the ultimate control of being able
to sever their ties. This is true even though what
goes on in those markets can have a profound
influence on their lives. Take, for example, debt
collection.116
Both the CFPB and Cordray ground their argument in the
assumption that because consumers are unable to
choose who collects their debts, no market checks are in
place to restrain overreach by collectors. The fact that
consumers do not choose their debt collectors directly,
however, does not mean that debt collectors face no
market restraints on overreaching behavior. Although
consumers cannot sever their ties from those seeking to
collect debts from them, originating lenders who sell or
assign those debts can. Further, to the extent that customers are aware of the identity of the creditor originating the debt, consumers will blame the original lender
for the actions of the assignee, at least to some extent.
Indeed, this point is illustrated by the OCC's observation
in issuing risk management guidance to national banks
and federal savings associations that the sale of accounts
to debt buyers raises a potential for reputational risk to
the bank."xz The comptroller observes:
Debt Collection (Regulation F), supra note 1, at 67849.
Richard Cordray, Dir., CFPB, Remarks at the National Baptist Convention, USA, Charlotte, NC (Sept. 5, 2013), (transcript available at
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/director-cordrayremarks-at-the-national-baptist-convention/).
"I See OCC BuLL., supra note 54.
116
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Banks should be keenly aware that debt buyers
pursue collection from former or current bank
customers. Even though a bank may have sold
consumer debt to a debt buyer, the debt buyer's
behavior can affect the bank's reputation if consumers continue to view themselves as bank customers. Moreover, abusive practices by debt purchasers, and other inappropriate debt-buyer
tactics (including those that cause violations of
law), are receiving significant levels of negative
news media coverage and public scrutiny. When
banks sell debt to debt buyers that engage in
practices perceived to be unfair or detrimental to
customers, banks can lose community support
and business."'
This check might be an even more powerful constraint
on debt buyers and- debt collectors than consumer dissatisfaction, because many originating creditors will be
sellers of multiple accounts. Thus, actions that alienate
customers against the originating creditors could provoke termination of the stream of business.
Moreover, the concern of lenders about the impact
on their reputations from the actions of third-party debt
collectors is not merely theoretical. Many major creditors, including Wells Fargo, have announced that they
will sell their debt only to debt buyers that meet the certification standards of the DBA International, a debtbuying industry trade group that certifies members on
the basis of their compliance with certain minimum
standards and ethics. 119
Furthermore, third-party debt collectors and debt
buyers provide value to the debt collection process in
these ways: (1) they provide expertise in the collection of
debts to reduce loss rates and the cost of collecting, (2)
they provide liquidity to the consumer credit system, and
(3) they provide an efficient level of debt collection activity in situations in which originating creditors are unwill18
119

Id. at 2.
Telephone Interview with Steve Dostal, Wells Fargo.
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ing or unable to do so.
First, third-party debt buyers and debt collectors
provide expertise in collections that will reduce costs of
recovery and bad debt losses. 120 Collection of debts from
delinquent consumers is a discrete stage in the consumer
credit system, and lenders that are primarily focused on
effectively underwriting loans on the front end of the
process or even on servicing their performing loans will
not necessarily also be experts in collecting nonperforming debts. The benefits of specialization are especially
obvious with respect to medical debts or student loans,
in which the consumer's debt is often originated with little or no underwriting. By specializing in the unique
methods of collecting nonperforming debt, debt collectors may be able to reduce lenders' losses on uncollectible debt at lower cost than the lenders could themselves.
Third-party collectors may also have comparative expertise and flexibility in structuring realistic payment arrangements that meet the constraints of the consumer's
budget and may use other flexible practices that increase
recovery at lower cost.
Second, third-party debt collectors and debt buyers increase liquidity in the consumer credit system. This
is most obvious in the case of debt buyers. By selling distressed debt, lenders can convert nonperforming debt into liquid assets that can be used productively.1" Debt collectors, which typically are paid on a contingency fee
basis, permit creditors to recover some of what is owed

120

See Debt Collection (Regulation F), supra note 1, at 67849 ("Third-

party collectors may possess capabilities and expertise in collections
that the creditors' in-house operations lack."). Moreover, as the CFPB
notes, third-party collectors are often paid on a contingency fee basis, which enables the original creditor to recover some of what is
owed without having to make up-front resource investments. See id.
121 See OCC BULL., supra note 54, at *1 ("The OCC recognizes that
banks can benefit from debt-sale arrangements by turning nonperforming assets into immediate cash proceeds and reducing the use
of internal resources to collect delinquent accounts. In connection
with charged-off loans, banks have a responsibility to their shareholders to recover losses.").
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without having to make up-front resource investments. 122
Third, third-party debt collectors may provide a solution to what would otherwise be a market failure if
creditors were required to collect their own debts. Namely, originating creditors might in some cases be insufficiently intensive in collecting debts, leading to inefficiently high losses. Although third-party debt collectors
are unlikely to be completely immune from any concerns
about goodwill because of the potential for their activities to be imputed by the consumer to the originating
lender, third-party debt collectors may be relatively less
limited by such extralegal constraints than are originating creditors. Although in some instances those weaker
extralegal checks can result in overly intensive debt collection methods, in other contexts the presence of thirdparty debt collectors can create an optimal level of debt
collection activity if the originating creditor is overly reluctant to engage in such practices for goodwill and reputational concerns.
In a competitive market, losses from uncollected
debts are passed on to other consumers in the form of
higher prices and restricted access to credit; thus, excessive forbearance from collecting debts is economically
inefficient. Again, as noted, collection activity has an effect on both the supply and the demand of consumer
credit. Although lax collection efforts will increase the
demand for credit by consumers, the higher losses associated with lax collection efforts will increase the costs of
lending and thus raise the price and reduce the supply of
lending to all consumers, especially higher-risk borrowers. The overall economic effect of reputational concerns
on collection activity is thus ambiguous: although reputational concerns can deter inefficiently harsh economic
collection activity (practices in which the costs to consumers outweigh the benefits), those same concerns in
some instances can also deter otherwise efficient collection activity as well, leading lenders to inefficiently reduce supply and raising costs for other consumers, thus

122

Debt Collection (Regulation F), supra note 1, at 67849.
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creating deadweight loss. In that case, the ability to assign certain debts to third-party debt collectors might
correct an inefficiency by promoting more intensive debt
collection efforts.
The historical experience of retail lending to consumers is suggestive. Historically, retailers provided
credit to consumers to facilitate purchase of the retailer's wares. But because the borrowers were also store
customers, the primary benefits to retailers of offering
credit were to promote customer loyalty and to sell merchandise.." 3 Indeed, retail credit operations typically operated at a loss to subsidize the retail function of the
store. 4 Because using more intensive collection
measures would have disrupted their ongoing relationship with the customer, retailers might have been expected to be less intensive in seeking to collect delinquent debts than would other types of consumer
creditors. Indeed, although many factors explain the displacement of store-branded credit cards by general acceptance bank-issued credit cards in recent decades, one
contributor is that bank-issued credit cards allow retailers to avoid the negative effects of alienating customers
because of their collection efforts, including, in some
2
cases, repossessing collateral."
In fact, findings by the National Commission on
Consumer Finance provided circumstantial evidence that
retail creditors tended to be less intensive at collecting
delinquent debts than were other creditors. The study
found that the grace period before a customer account
was declared delinquent was more than three times
longer for a retail trade creditor than for a bank lender
123
124

Zywicki, supra note 68, at 146-159.
Id. To offset losses on their credit operations, retailers also would

mark up the cost of the goods they sold, especially those such as
appliances that were typically sold on credit.
125 See Todd J. Zywicki, The Economics of Payment Card Interchange
Fees and the Limits of Regulation, in ICLE FINANCIAL REGULATORY
PROGRAM WHITE PAPER

12-13 (Institute of Continuing Legal Education,

June
2,
2010),
http://mercatus.org/sites/default/files/zywicki-interchange.pdf.
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(thirty-nine days versus twelve days) and more than
twice as long as for a finance company (thirty-nine days

versus sixteen days).1 1 6 Moreover, retail creditors were

substantially less likely than banks or finance companies
to telephone the debtor's employer or neighbors or to
personally visit the debtor (more intensive techniques
that were disfavored by debtors) to try to collect the
debt.12 7 At the same time, retail creditors were over three

times more likely than banks or finance companies to
describe referral to a third-party collection agency as an

effective method for collecting a debt.12 8 This finding

suggests that the ability to outsource debt collection was
especially valuable to retail creditors, perhaps because of
a reluctance to take more aggressive action on their
129

own.

Economists Viktar Fedasayeu and Robert Hunt
have suggested a related way in which third-party debt
collectors increase the efficiency of the system. 0 Recall
that one traditional rationale for regulation was the fear
of adverse selection: lenders that are lenient regarding
collections will tend to attract those borrowers with the

See Consumer Credit in the United States, in 1 TECHNICAL STUDIES OF
43, exhibit 3-2 (Dec.
1972).
127 Id. at 44, exhibit 3-4. For example, while 56% of banks and 49% of
finance companies reported that they would sometimes contact the
126
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debtor's employer to collect a debt, only 28% of retail installment
creditors reported that they did so.
128 Id. at 44, exhibit 3-3. Seven percent of banks, 6% of finance com-

panies, and 22% of retailers identified referral to a collector as an effective means for collecting a debt.
129 These differences in practice between banks and retailers
do not
demonstrate that either one pursues the optimal intensity level in
collections, but it does illustrate that they are not alike and that they
hold different levels of concern about goodwill, which may explain
why retailers might place higher value on the use of third-party collectors. In other words, both intensity levels could be efficient in the
particular context in which they operate.
130 Viktar Fedaseyeu & Robert M. Hunt, The Economics of Debt Collection: Enforcement of Consumer Credit Contracts (Fed. Reserve Bank

of Phila. Working Paper No. 14-7, 2014).
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greatest risk of default. 3 Thus, to prevent adverse selection from unraveling their credit pool, lenders will compete to be relatively less lenient than their competitors,
potentially creating an arms race toward more intensive
debt collection practices that could result in a market
equilibrium characterized by inefficient, overly intensive
debt collection practices that dampen consumer demand
for credit more than they increase lender supply. If so,
both lenders and borrowers could benefit from regulations that prevent this inefficient race.
But that particular argument is incomplete once a
lender's concern about preserving customer goodwill is
considered. In that case, the adverse selection dynamic
can theoretically run in the opposite direction, producing
a market equilibrium characterized by inefficiently lenient debt collection practices. Although it is true that a
creditor that adopts more intensive collection practices
will reduce losses in the short run, using more intensive
collection practices will also alienate consumers, causing
the creditor to lose business to lenders that adopt less
intensive debt collection practices. Thus, lenders concerned about their relative reputations may be led to be
overly lenient in efforts to collect debts, out of fear that
they will alienate possible consumers (as is arguably the
case for retailers, as previously discussed).
Fedasayeu and Hunt argue that one function of
third-party debt collectors is to prevent this race to lenient collection practices by essentially allowing creditors
to implicitly coordinate their level of intensiveness in
pursuing debtors for collection.132 If multiple competing
creditors retain the same collection agency, then no single creditor will suffer relative reputational harm from
pursuing intensive collection strategies. As the agent for
all creditors as a group, the debt collection agency will be
unconcerned about the relative reputation among creditors but instead might act more closely to how an individual creditor would act: namely, to maximize the equi111

See supra discussion at notes 88-89.
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Fedaseyeu & Hunt, supra note 129.
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librium quantity of credit supplied and demanded. Fedasayeu and Hunt write,
Without third-party debt collectors, creditors
would be forced to collect on their own and
would tend to use lenient collection practices for
fear of damaging their individual reputations
(which would reduce demand for their services).
A third-party agency collecting on behalf of several creditors, on the other hand, may use harsher debt collection practices than the creditors
would. This is because those practices will be associated with all creditors that hired this agency,
in which case, borrowers cannot discriminate
against individual creditors. As a result, all creditors that hire third-party debt collectors may
have bad reputations, but no individual lender
may be seen as any worse than any other individual lender.'33
The debt collector, as an agent for the industry as
a whole, would essentially internalize all of the costs and
benefits of the level of debt collection intensiveness that
it chooses, including any reputation effects on the industry as a whole. Most significant, however, the debt collection agency would be willing to use more intensive debt
collection practices than would individual creditors acting in an uncoordinated fashion. Fedasayeu and Hunt
point to the generally accepted belief that collection
agencies tend to use more intensive debt collection practices than do creditors. Thus, even though third-party
collectors use more intensive tactics than do creditors
collecting their own debts, the tactics used by thirdparties are not necessarily inefficiently aggressive; it depends on the context whether use of third parties will
improve consumer welfare overall.3 4 Fedasayeu and Hunt
write:
Since third-party debt collectors facilitate more
effective collections than individual creditors are

133
134

Id. at 2.

Id. at 28.
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able to implement on their own, their presence
can increase the supply of credit and may raise
total borrower welfare under certain conditions.
At the same time, there are circumstances under
which the existence of third-party debt collection
agencies may lower borrower welfare because of
the increase in the overall harshness (and therefore disutility) of debt collection.13
Moreover, riskier borrowers could benefit the most
if the increase in post-default recoveries leads to a reduction in interest rates and expansion of supply to riskier borrowers.136
The unique value contributed by third-party debt
collectors in Fedaseyeu and Hunt's model is the willingness of third parties to use more intensive debt collection measures than creditors would use if they were collecting their own debts. The overall value of the
consumer credit system, therefore, is maximized by the
combination of two different types of parties seeking to
collect debts: creditors collecting their own debts, who
will be relatively less intensive in collecting, and thirdparty debt collectors and debt buyers, who will be relatively more intensive in collecting. Thus, the value of
third-party debt collectors stems precisely from their
distinctive willingness to use more intensive measures
than creditors use collecting their own debts. Precisely
because debt collectors are less constrained by goodwill
concerns, consumers benefit from their use by lenders in
some situations. Indeed, third-party debt buyers and collectors may be the market solution to what otherwise
would be market failure and adverse selection problems.
In other words, although it is generally recognized that
third-party debt collectors tend to use more intensive
collection procedures than creditors use collecting their
own debts, this observation does not necessarily imply
that the methods used by debt collectors are excessively
intensive or that the efficient level of effort would be
reached by forbidding creditors from outsourcing collec13

Id. at 3.

136

Id. at 27.
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tion. The optimal mix of first-party and third-party debt
collection will likely vary across industry and type of
debt.
VII. ANALYZING CFPB's PROPOSED REGULATIONS
From its inception, the CFPB has styled itself as a
"data-driven agency" whose regulations are grounded in
sound economics and empirical support.137 Given the
complex nature of the economic tradeoffs involved in
regulating consumer credit and the potential for unintended consequences flowing from regulation of debt
collection practices, this data-driven approach is especially valuable for assessing the wisdom of new regulations on debt collection. The CFPB should conduct rigorous cost-benefit analysis before proposing new
restrictions on debt collection activities.
Before adding new regulations, the CFPB should
take care to precisely identify what market failure it believes to exist; whether government regulation is the
most effective means of redressing that market failure;
and whether, in fact, government regulation can be written and implemented in such a manner that the marginal
benefits exceed the marginal costs to consumers. Each of
these steps requires careful analysis. For example, as
noted previously, although the CFPB has articulated a
plausible hypothesis of market failure that arises from
the inability of consumers to choose the identity of their
debt collector, that argument is incomplete as a theoretical matter and contestable as an empirical matter. In
fact, what looks at first glance like a market failure might
actually be the solution to what otherwise would be a
market failure, thus raising the possibility that efforts to
protect consumers might actually result in harming them
instead.
But even if a market failure is determined to be
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See CFPB,
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harmful to consumers, the CFPB should also consider
whether new government regulation is the most effective
way of addressing that market failure. With respect to
the debt-buying industry, for example, the industry has
established a self-regulatory certification system for debt
buyers and, as noted, many large debt sellers have announced that they will sell their debt only to firms that
are certified under those standards, in large part because
of their concern that the actions of parties to whom they
assign or sell their debt will be imputed to them."8 Thus,
market pressure and voluntary action, combined with
oversight from other regulators, might be addressing
many of the CFPB's concerns already.
Federal Trade Commissioner Maureen Ohlhausen
has provided a general framework for understanding the
potential benefits of industry self-regulation as a first
line of regulation:
Self-regulation has several advantages over government regulation:
1.It can be more prompt, flexible, responsive, and
easier to reconfigure than major regulatory systems
that must be changed via legislation or agency
rulemaking.
2.Self-regulation will be well attuned to market realities where self-regulatory organizations have obtained the support of member firms.
3.Judgment and hands-on experience enable brightline rules that are workable for firms.
4.Through compliance generated through "buy-in," it
can offer a less adversarial, more efficient dispute
resolution mechanism than formal legal procedures.
5.The cost burden falls on industry participants rather than [the] general taxpayer.139
138

See supra discussion accompanying note 117.

"I See Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Remarks
before the Direct Selling Education Foundation Self-Regulation and
Consumer Protection Panel (Apr. 7, 2015) at 3. In the same speech,
Ohlhausen also discusses the limits to industry self-regulation.
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Other regulators also regulate debt collection practices. Notably, the OCC requires banks under its supervision to monitor those to whom the bank sells debt for
collection. Before imposing new regulations, the CFPB
should consider the extent to which industry selfregulation, market forces, and other regulation also protect consumers and the extent to which additional regulation might actually backfire and harm consumers.
Understanding the economic analysis of debt collection and its regulation can guide the CFPB in its analysis of new debt collection rules. The focus here is on
three areas in particular: (1) new information provision
requirements between creditors and third-party collectors; (2) regulation of permissible contacts with consumers in light of changes in communications technology,
such as the advent of cell phone, email, and text messaging technology; and (3) the collection of debts outside of
the statute of limitations. 10 The point of this analysis
generally is not to definitively recommend or not recommend certain regulatory provisions but to identify the
potential unintended consequences of these types of
regulations in light of economic principles and to provide guidance to the CFPB in studying the likely effect of
regulation, including potential unintended consequences
for consumers-both those who are subject to collections and those who are not.
A. Information ProvisionRequirements
Although the CFPB's basis for requiring creditors
to provide collectors with additional information is
somewhat murky, apparently the CFPB believes that a
market failure can be corrected by increasing incentives
to creditors to provide accurate and adequate amounts
of information to debt collectors. The ANPR states,
"[i]ncentives in the marketplace may not be sufficient in
some circumstances to result in collectors having ade140

A fourth area, the CFPB's consideration of applying the rules of

the FDCPA to creditors collecting their own debts, has been implicitly discussed already and will not be repeated here.
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quate information."14 ' For example, the CFPB argues that
"debt collectors seeking to maximize profits may not acquire sufficient information about the amount of debts
[owed],' 42 because having an accurate assessment of the
total amount owed may not benefit the third-party collector sufficiently in light of the cost to the creditor of
providing it. Given that increasing the accuracy of information with respect to the balance owed would impose
some cost on the creditor, the CFPB asserts that if the
cost to the creditor is larger than the benefit to the collector, this information will not be provided. Thus,
"[e]ven if collectors would benefit from additional information that permits them to calculate the outstanding
balance more accurately, the cost to the collector of acquiring this additional information may still exceed its
benefit to the collector, while if the benefits to consumers were considered the overall value of the information
may exceed the cost."'43
The CFPB's identification of the precise source and
extent of any market failure, however, is not well specified. The CFPB suggests that one justification for requiring the transmission of additional information is that
third-party collectors themselves desire more information than is often provided. For example, the bureau
claims, "[d]ebt owners, collectors, consumer advocates,
and the FTC have all raised concerns about the adequacy
of information transferred with debts when debts are
placed with a collector or sold to a debt buyer."1 Yet the
ANPR itself seems to contradict this assertion that thirdparty collectors lack incentives to insist on adequate information. The CFPB then refers to the findings of a 2009
FTC report, which noted that inadequate information
flows in the debt collection system had "repercussions
... for both debt collectors and consumers."'45 Moreover,
a lack of adequate information can be fatal to collection
of a creditor's claim if its enforcement ends up in litigaDebt Collection (Regulation F), supra note 1, at 67854.
Id. at 67854, n. 70.
143 Id.
144 Id. at 67854 (emphasis added).
141 Id. (emphasis added).
141

142
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tion in order to prove the validity of the claim; hence,
third parties in fact do have incentives to seek more information. In addition, the CFPB notes that technological
innovation has dramatically reduced the cost to creditors
and collectors of obtaining, storing, and transferring data about consumers and their debts, suggesting that it
should be easier
for debt collectors to obtain the desired
146
information.

The combination of these factors-demands by
collectors for greater information from creditors combined with declining costs of providing that information-raises doubts about the CFPB's suggestion that
creditors have inadequate incentives to provide adequate
information to collectors. Although the CFPB may be correct in its belief that there is a market failure and that
new mandates for the transmission and storage of information might efficiently address this market failure, it
has provided no solid empirical or economic evidence to
support those contentions. In particular, CFPB has not
tried to quantify the cost of the new requirements to
creditors and debt collectors with any rigor, nor has it
made an effort to estimate the marginal benefit, if any,
to consumers from the new information-sharing requirements.
To the extent that market failure occurs with respect to transmission of information, therefore, the
CFPB's real concern appears to be that there are external
benefits to consumers from the provision of more information beyond the private benefits to collectors. Before mandating that creditors provide more information
to collectors to protect consumers, however, the CFPB
should make a rigorous effort to establish how much and
what type of information should be provided that currently is not being provided. The CFPB should be careful
not to impose needless regulations regarding records
preservation and transfer that impose costs without

146

Id. In fact, the CFPB notes that some creditors and collectors have

established highly sophisticated information-sharing processes to
address these issues. Id. at 67855.
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compensating benefits. Indeed, in addition to the costs
of such regulations to creditors and collectors, requiring
greater amounts of information to be transmitted to
third parties could raise questions of consumer privacy
and security regarding individual information.
The CFPB also should be careful not to create
needlessly complicated rules that could permit consumers to escape liability opportunistically. For example, according to the DBA International survey, 80% of debt
buyers already believe that more than half the time disputes filed by consumers "are used primarily as a delaying tactic" rather than a good-faith effort to reconcile the
unpaid obligation.147 Although the respondents to that
survey obviously are interested (and biased) parties and
thus might overstate the number of opportunistic consumers, their thoughts are a reminder that it cannot be
assumed that all consumers invariably act in good faith
when they dispute a debt. The CFPB should be careful
not to create opportunities to escape liability for valid
debts on a pure technicality.
As with other regulations that make debt collection more difficult and expensive, there will likely be distributional consequences as well. To the extent that some
of the costs of providing information are fixed costs that
are invariant to loan size, those regulations will disproportionately increase the cost of collecting smaller debts
relative to larger debts. Additionally, although an optimal
level of accuracy is to be desired regardless of the size of
the debt in question, disproportionately raising the costs
of collecting smaller debts could cause creditors to stop
providing smaller debt or could force them to raise prices.
B. Communicationswith Debtors
In its ANPR, the CFPB recognizes that "[plerhaps
the greatest transformations" in the debt collection landscape since the enactment of the FDCPA are "in the tech-

147
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supra note 49, at 41.
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nologies that debt collectors and debt owners use to
' The problem of craftcommunicate with consumers."148
ing an effective regulatory scheme that will keep pace
with changes in telecommunications technology is not a
new problem. Recall that one of the primary justifications for the FDCPA itself was the dramatic decline in the
cost of long-distance phone calls, which enabled out-ofstate debt collectors to collect debts more easily and
ended the traditionally localized nature of debt collection services. The challenges today are no different, but
the experience with the FDCPA is useful to guide regulation in this area. As the CFPB observes:
The statute itself contemplates communications
via telephone, postal mail, and telegraph, but it
does not reflect the advent of the [Internet,
smartphones, autodialers, fax machines, and social media. These newer technologies present
new challenges and new opportunities. The challenges often arise when attempting to apply the
FDCPA's prohibitions to a technology that was
not envisioned at the time of its enactment and
may not easily fit its statutory framework. Nonetheless, these technologies also create new opportunities for consumers, debt collectors, and
debt owners to communicate in ways that may
be more convenient and less costly than prior
methods.149

In addition, many of these new technologies raise
regulatory issues that overlap with other regulatory
schemes, such as the Telephone Consumer Protection
Act, which prohibits using autodialers to call an individual's cell phone without the individual's express consent.1 0 As originally enacted, the law was meant to protect consumers from telemarketing calls to their cell
phones, because cell phone service contracts traditionally required the consumer to pay for any incoming calls to
the phone.

148

149
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Debt Collection (Regulation F), supra note 1, at 67863.
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47 U.S.C. § 227.
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Yet this requirement that creditors must secure
express consent before calling a cell phone is much less
reasonable today than when first enacted. Many people
have only a cell phone; thus, if a debt collector cannot
use an autodialer to contact a debtor's cell phone it is effectively uneconomical to communicate with debtors by
at reasonable cost. According to a 2013 National Health
Interview Survey, 41% of American households today
have only a cell phone, and an additional 16% have a
landline but receive all or almost all calls on a cell
phone."' Thus, over half of American adults use their cell
phones exclusively or almost exclusively. Among younger households, the trend is even more pronounced: according to one estimate, two-thirds of households headed by people ages twenty-five to twenty-nine have only
mobile phones.1 2 Seventy-six percent of people living in

rented housing with an unrelated roommate, 61.7% of
renters (compared with 28.5% of homeowners), and 56%
of those living in poverty (compared with 36% of higherincome adults) also have cell phones only."3 Because telephone communications are a low-cost and effective extralegal means for creditors to communicate with debtors, prohibiting contact on the debtor's cell phone will
effectively prohibit useful communication between the
creditor and debtor. Restricting the ability to contact
these households will reduce the likelihood of inexpensive and amicable resolution of disputes and force collectors to use other more expensive techniques, such as
lawsuits.
Moreover, it is unclear under current law what
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constitutes "express consent" by the debtor to permit
contact on his or her cell phone. In particular, on an original application for credit, borrowers often provide a cell
phone number as their contact number, especially those
who have only a cell phone. Does providing a cell phone
number on a credit application constitute express consent to be contacted by a debt collector concerning the
recovery of the debt? Case law is uncertain on this
5 4 The CFPB should clarify that by providing a cell
point."
phone number in connection with a credit application, a
borrower is expressly consenting to be contacted at that
number in a subsequent collection effort.
Widespread use of cell phones also presents a
challenge for the FDCPA's bar on contacting consumers
at "any unusual time or place or at time or place known
or which should be known to be inconvenient to the consumer." ' Moreover, the statute provides, "[i]n the absence of knowledge to the contrary, a collector shall assume that a convenient time for communicating with a
consumer is" between 8:00 a.m. and 9:00 p.m. local time
at the consumer's location.156
Traditionally, when households relied on landline
phones, a collector generally could determine the consumer's time zone from the area code on the number.5 7
Today, however, people take their phones with them
when they travel and may travel across time zones. Indeed, consumers frequently take their phones with them
when they move permanently. As a result, the phone's
area code is no longer a reliable proxy for the borrower's
location. Given this problem, the FTC recommended that
collectors be permitted to assume, for the purpose of determining appropriate calling hours, "that the consumer
was located in the same time zone as her home ad-

114

Compare Penn v. NRA Group, LLC, Case No. 1:13-CV-00785-JKB

(D. Md. July 1, 2014), with Mais v. Gulf Coast Collection Bureau, Inc.,
944 F. Supp. 1226 (S.D. Fla. 2013).
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The CFPB should adopt this sensible proposal.

Additional issues arise with respect to communica5 9 Consumers can
tions through email and text messages."
use caller ID to screen unwanted or inconvenient calls.
And although it is true, as the CFPB observes, that many
consumers receive alerts when text messages or emails
are received, modern mobile phones and the like provide
consumers with the ability to silence or use a "do not
disturb" function to control notifications at inconvenient
hours. Thus, unlike traditional telephone calls, whose
ring could disrupt the debtor's household if received at
inconvenient hours, an individual can control the potential for disruption from an incoming text or email message. Moreover, many of the traditional concerns about
communications at inconvenient hours can be alleviated
by the debtors themselves in this case. In addition, email
and text communications are almost always private and
read only by the intended recipient.
Despite the benefits of communications through
email and text message, a survey of its members by DBA
International found that because of the fear of liability
resulting from the unsettled nature of law and regulation, only 15% of respondents communicate with consumers through email or other electronic means. 1 0 In
considering the regulation of communications using new
technologies, therefore, the CFPB can be informed by the
economics of debt collection: prohibiting or limiting the
use of low-cost and effective communications technology
will lead creditors and collectors to escalate to more intensive collection actions earlier in the debt collection
cycle, a development that is unlikely to benefit consumers overall. In fact, many consumer advocates have
claimed that the frequency of debt collection litigation
against consumers has increased in recent years.161 Although the reasons for this trend have not been studied
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systematically, a contributing factor could be the decreasing effectiveness of informal communications as a
result of changes in communications technology and of
heightened regulation. As it has become more difficult to
reach consumers by telephone, for example, economic
analysis suggests that collectors will more readily escalate to formal, albeit more expensive, techniques for collecting debts, such as lawsuits. Increasing the cost or reducing the effectiveness of debt collection will also lead
to a higher minimum-sized debt to be pursued, meaning
that many smaller debts will simply be written off without collection, which eventually will filter through the
consumer credit system in higher prices and less access
to credit for consumers. Given the sweeping changes in
the nature of technology and communications with consumers, the CFPB should update the FDCPA and TCPA to
permit contact through electronic communications
methods, such as cell phones, email, and text.
Enabling creditors to more routinely contact consumers on their cell phones raises novel and challenging
new problems, such as contacting consumers when they
are away from home, such as at work, in their cars, or at
other times when they resent being disturbed. But given
the increasing number of households that have no home
phone, the costs for consumers of a de facto ban on cell
phone contacts is high as well, suggesting that regulation
that recognizes the need for effectively contacting consumers should be balanced against this risk of intrusion
and consumer inconvenience. Striking a balance between
the competing goals of facilitating effective communication while protecting consumers from improper disturbance is difficult and eludes easy answers. The CFPB
should weigh these concerns carefully.
C. Collection of Debts outside the Statute of Limitations
Another controversial issue regarding debt collection is the collection of time-barred, also called "out-ofstatute," debts-that is, debts that are older than the applicable statute of limitations for bringing a suit to enforce the debt. Federal law currently is silent with respect to the collection of time-barred debts, but some
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states limit the use of lawsuits to collect time-barred

debts. 6 2 In 2012, however, the U.S. Department of Justice

brought an action on behalf of the FTC against a debt
buyer that allegedly collected on time-barred debt without disclosing to consumers that they could not be sued
on the debt.'63 The complaint alleged that it was deceptive for Asset Acceptance not to disclose to consumers
that they could not be sued if they did not pay the debt.
Later in 2012, the CFPB entered into a settlement agreement with a bank collecting on its own debts that required the bank to provide disclosures regarding its right
to sue when collecting debts outside the applicable statute of limitations. 164 Rules also differ among states as to

whether partial payment of a debt revives the entire balance due for a new statute of limitations period, although in most states it does. As the CFPB observes,
"consumers may believe that when they make a partial
payment on a time-barred debt they have only obligated
themselves in the amount of the partial
payment, but in
1 6
many circumstances that is not true.
Although collection of out-of-statute debt has received substantial regulatory and other attention, it is
not clear whether the issue is a large systemic problem
and whether the concern is best addressed through caseby-case enforcement. According to the FTC's debt-buying
report, 87% of the debt purchased by debt buyers from
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Jan.
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original creditors was less than six years old.16 Although
debt purchased from other debt buyers tended to be
older on average, 70% of that debt also was less than six
years old.
As with the other specific areas .discussed, the
CFPB should move cautiously before taking actions that
would preempt state law by forbidding collection of
time-barred debts or by mandating additional disclosures with respect to time-barred debts. As the CFPB
notes, informing consumers that certain old debts are legally unenforceable is likely to reduce their willingness

to pay the debt. 16 7 Additionally, although it may seem un-

fair at first glance for creditors to collect on debts that
are unenforceable, one must remember that higher creditor losses eventually will be passed on to consumers in
the form of higher prices and reduced credit access.
Moreover, the statute of limitations was never intended
merely as a loophole to allow parties to escape liability;
rather, it was designed to prevent fraudulent litigation
that could clog the court system, to avoid the deterioration of evidence that could undermine the accuracy of
the fact-finding process, and to provide defendants with
some degree of certainty beyond which they could not be
sued.168 As one law review article described the analytical
framework,
From a purely economic point of view, the statute of limitations should bar a claim only when
the sum of all costs incurred if the claim is not
barred (including the risk of inaccurate adjudication, the costs of record-keeping and insurance
premiums, the psychological harm to potential
defendants, the disruption of the reliance interests of nonparties, and the like) outweigh the
166
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sum of all costs of not implementing the substantive law in what is probably a relatively small
subset of cases. If this cost-benefit analysis has
been properly calibrated, then the loss of a valid
claim is an unfortunate, but necessary, consequence of a trade-off169that has been made to maximize social welfare.

Notably, many of these potential costs are avoided when
a borrower voluntarily pays a debt-even if he is unaware that the debt is otherwise unenforceable under the
statute of limitations. More specifically, the statute of
limitations is designed to advance goals other than the
accurate resolution of litigation on the merits. Thus, preventing the enforcement of time-barred debt disproportionately relieves debtors of the obligation to pay legitimate claims; this result is not within the realm of the
policies advanced by the statute of limitations.
Moreover, many of the factors that previously
supported limits on the collection of older debt have
been reduced in importance in recent years. For example,
the risk of inaccurate adjudication and record-keeping
costs have been reduced dramatically by technological
advances in document retention and provision. In addition, many of these concerns have been ameliorated
through government regulation, such as the California
Debt Buyers Act, and industry self-regulation, such as
the DBA's certification program, that have increased the
obligations on debt collectors and debt buyers to retain
and transmit accurate information about the collection
of older debt.17 0
Moreover, although some consumers might benefit

Id. at 506.
See DBA, Out-of-Statute Debt: What is a Smart, Balanced and Responsible Approach? 6 (June 19, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with author). DBA-certified companies, for example, are prohibited from knowingly filing lawsuits to enforce out-of-statute debts.
Variation in state laws and complexities regarding choice of law, on
the other hand, can lead to the inadvertent filing of lawsuits to enforce debt that could be validly enforced in one state but is timebarred in another.
169
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from laws that forbid the enforcement of time-barred
debt, such laws will also have harmful unintended consequences for consumers beyond the obvious economic
effect of leading to increased interest rates and a reduction in lending volume, especially for higher-risk consumers. Most notably, by extinguishing debts after the
statute of limitations expires, such laws likely increase
the number of lawsuits filed against debtors to enforce
debts immediately before the expiration of the statute of
limitations (although how much more litigation would
result is unclear). Using litigation to enforce debts is, of
course, an entirely permissible manner of enforcing contractual obligations. Indeed, in some cases, filing suit
might actually benefit consumers, either by giving them
an opportunity to contest the claim or by bringing the
debtor and creditor together to try to negotiate a compromise.
Nevertheless, litigation is expensive and disruptive
for consumers, collectors, and the judicial system. When
debts are enforced by litigation, the debtor may not only
be liable for the debt but also be liable for court costs,
interest, and creditors' attorneys' fees. And although litigation theoretically can increase protection for debtors,
in practice most debt collection cases result in default
judgments. Approximately half or more of debt collection lawsuits result in a default judgment against the
debtor. 171 Approximately 98% of consumers who are sued

regarding debt collection matters do not have legal rep-

See Judith Fox, Do We Have a Debt Collection Crisis? Some Cautionary Tales of Debt Collection in Indiana, 24 Loy. CONSUMER L. REV.
355, 377 (2012) ("Of the 97,027 cases resolved by the Indiana courts
in 2009, 58,979, or roughly 61% were resolved by default judgments
for the plaintiffs."). See also STIFLER & PARMSH, supra note 107, at 13.
Stifler and Parrish also claim that a greater percentage of debt collection lawsuits involving minority and low-income debtors results
in default judgments than do lawsuits overall. Id. at 18-19. See also
Peter A. Holland, Junk Justice:A StatisticalAnalysis of 4,400 Lawsuits
Filed by Debt Buyers, 26 LoY. CONSUMER L. REV. 179, 228 (2014) (reviewing studies and estimating that roughly 38-81% of debt collection cases result in default judgments).
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1 Although the CFPB's ANPR poses several
resentation.72
questions regarding regulation of collection of timebarred debt, it asks no questions about whether doing so
would increase litigation against consumers or whether
consumers would be made better off overall, questions
the agency should explore
before limiting the collection
173

of time-barred debt.

Extinguishing time-barred debts may have another
adverse unintended consequence for some consumers.
Even if a debt is legally discharged, it still remains on the
consumer's credit report for seven years. Once the debt
is legally extinguished, however, the debtor cannot settle
it and, as a result, has no means of removing the unpaid
debt from the credit report. For debtors who would like
to clear old debts to purchase a home, secure a job, or
obtain a security clearance, the costs of the inability to
settle a time-barred debt can exceed any short-term benefit gained from being released from the legal obligation
to pay it. 74

VIII. CONCLUSION
Debt collection is one of the most heavily regulated areas of the consumer credit ecosystem. Yet it is also
one of the most important: without an efficacious and
efficient debt collection system, creditors will be unable
to lend, and borrowers will be unable to borrow. Although consumers who do not pay their debts are benefited by an excessively restrictive debt collection regulatory regime, everyone else pays more in the form of
higher interest rates and reduced access to credit. Highrisk borrowers, however, will likely feel the effects the
most. Moreover, although low-risk and higher-income
borrowers who can provide collateral may avoid many of
the costs of a less efficient debt collection regime, highrisk and lower-income borrowers will not. High-risk borrowers might instead be driven toward greater use of

172See
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Holland, supra note 170, at 187.
See Debt Collection (Regulation F), supra note 1, at 67875-76.
See DBA INT'L, DEBT BUYING, supra note 2, at 8.
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pawnshops and payday lenders.
Identifying optimal debt collection rules is a challenging economic problem: although more restrictive
regulation raises the cost of lending for creditors (thereby reducing the supply and raising some costs), it also
can increase the demand for credit by consumers. And
although regulators have asserted the presence of a variety of market failures, their magnitude is unclear, and
regulators must be very cautious about imposing new
regulations whose costs exceed the benefits for consumers. Regulations that provide consumers with "protections" that are not justified by the costs that they impose
will not benefit consumers. Especially because of the extensive regulatory regime already on the books, many of
the most controversial debt collection practices that are
most likely to harm consumers have already been regulated. Against this regulatory backdrop, finding additional restrictions for which the marginal benefits exceed
the marginal costs will be challenging.
In addition to understanding the macro effect that
debt collection regulations have on the price of and access to credit, regulators should consider the internal
economic logic of debt collection. Economists have identified a sliding scale of debt collection practices, starting
with the least expensive and least intensive measures,
such as phone calls and letters, and then escalating to
more intensive and more expensive measures only where
less intensive measures fail and more expensive
measures are cost justified. Indeed, in some instances of
small-dollar accounts, creditors or debt collectors originate no contact at all, waiting for the consumer to contact them. Inefficient limits on debt collection efforts,
however, will short-circuit this organic process of escalation. Therefore, if less intensive measures are unavailable
or reduced in effectiveness, creditors and collectors will
escalate their collection efforts more rapidly (a move that
is unlikely to benefit consumers) or, alternatively, will
simply write off smaller debts (a practice that is also of
dubious benefit because it will lead to less lending to
those consumers in the future).
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The debt collection dynamic has particular relevance for regulations governing emerging electronic
technologies such as cell phones, email, and text messages. Today, those electronic means are the most effective ways to reach many consumers, and the only way to
reach a growing number of consumers. Yet current law is
written for 1970s and 1980s technology and is focused
on landline telephones and letters. Not only are cell
phones, email, and the like the most effective way to
reach consumers, but also the private nature of these
technologies and the consumer's ability to control them
(by, for example, turning off ringers, silencing calls, or
controlling alerts) alleviates many of the concerns about
traditional methods, such as disruptive telephone calls.
Although permitting contact of consumers on cell
phones and the like raises novel issues of consumer protection, the CFPB should carefully try to balance those
concerns against the opportunities that these technologies present for a more effective and less litigious debt
collection system.
Finally, in considering new regulations, the CFPB
also should consider the larger economic and regulatory
context and the way its new regulations will interact with
other institutions. First, it should consider how new regulations can complement existing market incentives and
self-regulatory structures, taking into account the peculiar characteristics of particular industries, such as the
size of the average debts to collect and the tools available to collect on them. Private solutions may provide
greater flexibility and higher value at lower cost for consumers and the economy than new government regulations. Second, the CFPB also should consider the ways in
which its regulations interact with other regulatory bodies, such as the OCC. Third, the CFPB should consider the
way in which one-size-fits-all regulations might interact
with state regulations, including state substantive regulations of other terms of consumer credit contracts, such
as usury regulations.

